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Transit of Straits and Archipelagic Waters
by Military Aircraft
Bernard H Oxman*
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea balances the interests of states
in ways that are more refined than the classic summa divisio between the
free high seas and territorial waters. The result for aviation is the preservation
of freedom of overflight for civil and military aircraft seaward of the territorial
sea in the exclusive economic zone as on the high seas beyond, and the right
of such aircraft to transit archipelagic waters as well as straits comprised
of territorial seas and internal waters. A proper understanding of the scope
of these rights and their relationship to the UN Charter and the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation is of considerable importance to
international peace and security and global communications.
I. INTRODUCTION

SOME two-thirds of the earth's surface is covered by water. Since time
immemorial, the seas have been a principal avenue for trade and
communications, both within and between regions. In an increasingly
interdependent world, the right to communicate is one of the most
important attributes of sovereignty and one of the indispensable elements
of both international security and economic development. It is important to bear this in mind in a context where the word 'sovereignty'
is often used to refer only to territory.
Navigation on or under the sea requires craft specially built for this
purpose. Ships are generally unable to operate on land. Their capacity
to move from one place to another requires that they follow the sea
and negotiate the narrow passages between open seas.
The same is true of aircraft whose mission it is to travel with ships,
for example to provide air cover for a naval task force. But apart from
that situation, air navigation is not subject to geographic constraints
to the same degree as ships. Aircraft are generally able to fly over
sea and land. Overflight is, however, subject to legal and political
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constraints. Where aircraft lack the right to fly over the territory of
states en route to their destination, and are unable to obtain special
permission to do so, their only option is to fly over the sea. Thus,
they too may be compelled to follow the sea and negotiate the narrow
passages between open seas.
This difference is important in understanding and applying the
regimes applicable to overflight at sea. For most aircraft, direct pointto-point routes over land and sea are the norm. Aircraft are most likely
to divert their routes and remain over the sea when, for legal or political
reasons, they have no better alternative. Accordingly, the question
of the rights of states to control or regulate overflight of areas off
the coast arises in a particularly sensitive context: offshore routes
in the vicinity of the coast are most likely to be needed in situations
where those states are least likely to allow flight over their territory
for political reasons. Military overflight in periods of political tension
is one example.'

II. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Whatever the rights of states with respect to overflight, they are subject
to the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Article 103 of the
Charter provides that in the event of a conflict between obligations
under the Charter and obligations under any other international
agreement, the obligations under the Charter prevail.
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter requires that
states 'refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations.' This applies both to the state exercising overflight
rights and to other states, including the state whose territory is being
overflown. In the latter regard, it should be evident that the right to
communicate is a basic component of the political independence of

1

See John Norton Moore, 'The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea', (1980) 74AJIL 77,84. Moore's article responds
to the critique in Michael Reisman, 'The Regime of Straits and National Security:
An Appraisal of International Lawmaking', (1980) 74AJIL 48. Attempts by others
to rely on Reisman's critique as support for restrictions on navigation and
overflight misunderstand the article: 'An acceptable public order of the oceans
as it pertains to security should provide for wide surface and aerial access and
rights of submerged passage as unconditionally as possible'. Ibid, at 53.
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a state.' Indeed, under classic international law, obstruction of that
right might constitute a causus belli.
Article 51 provides that nothing in the Charter 'shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs.' 3 This too applies both to the state exercising overflight rights
and to other states, including the state whose territory is being overflown.
In the context of the present analysis, it provides the legal basis for
a state to take action in self-defense either against 4or to protect 5 aircraft
in flight.
Pursuant to article 25 (as well as other provisions) of the Charter,
members of the United Nations are bound to 'accept and carry out
the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter.' Under article 39, the Security Council has the power to 'determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
2

3

4

5

In a case brought by Spain against Canada for seizing a Spanish fishing vessel
on the high seas, Spain alleged, among other things, that Canada thereby
engaged in an unlawful use of force and argued that the dispute therefore did
not come within the terms of Canada's reservation to the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice regarding 'disputes arising out of or concerning
conservation and management measures taken by Canada with respect to
vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area, as defined in the Convention on
Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 1978, and
the enforcement of such measures.' For its part, Canada sought to distinguish
between enforcement of fisheries laws and the use of force under the Charter.
Because it found that the Canadian reservation applied without regard to the
legality of the actions contemplated thereby, the Court decided that it lacked
jurisdiction over the case and did not pass on the merits of Spain's allegations
or the legality of Canada's actions. FisheriesJurisdiction(Spain v Canada),
Dec 4, 1998 (Jurisdiction) <http://www.icj-cij.org>.
Article 51 specifies that this does 'not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security'. In addition to the Charter, the rules of customary international
law also apply, including the requirements of necessity and proportionality.
ICAO has developed detailed standards and recommended practices regarding
the interception of civil aircraft, and has adopted a new article 3 bis of the
Chicago Convention, infra note 9, prohibiting the use of weapons against civil
aircraft in flight (which has been widely ratified but is not yet in force). These
rules do not apply to the interception of military aircraft. They nevertheless
may supply useful guidance in situations where some purpose other than selfdefense is the object of the interception or where the law of self-defense would
itself limit the use of weapons.
Thus, for example, article 6 of the NATO Treaty provides that an armed attack
on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the 'aircraft
of any of the Parties' when over the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic
area north of the Tropic of Cancer. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr 4, 1949, art 6,
34 UNTS 243.
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of aggression' and may either make recommendations or 'decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security.' Article 41 deals
with measures not involving the use of armed force, which may include
'complete or partial interruption of ... air ... communication.' Article
42 deals with 'action by air, sea, or land forces', which may include
'demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land
forces of Members of the United Nations.' Pursuant to these provisions,
the Security Council may make, and indeed has made, decisions to
interrupt air communication and to authorize forces of UN members
to carry out its decisions.
Ill. THE RECEIVED REGIMES
Well before the twentieth century, it was already clear that customary
international law distinguished between the land and the sea. In this
connection, although he doubtless was not addressing questions of
international law, it is interesting to ponder the celebrated lines from
Byron's poem Childe Harold:
Roll on, thou deep and dark blue ocean-roll!
Ten thousand fleets sweep over thee in vain;
Man marks the earth with ruin-his control
Stops with the shore.

In .general, land areas were subject to the acquisition of national
sovereignty. With respect to terra nullius, such sovereignty could be
acquired by effective occupation. On the other hand, the sea was open
to use by all and could not be subjected to claims of sovereignty,
including claims based on effective occupation. 6 A limited exception
was eventually made for a narrow band of sea adjacent to the coast
that came to be known as the territorial sea, classically regarded as7
extending one marine league (three nautical miles) from the coast.
At the same time, little attention was devoted to the status of air space,

6
7

Prescriptive claims to 'historic' waters are relatively rare and require an affirmative
showing of continuing control acquiesced in by other states.
Stating that 'when this nation was formed, the idea of a three-mile belt over
which a littoral nation could exercise rights of ownership was but a nebulous
suggestion,' the Supreme Court of the United States concludes that the colonies
did not have a territorial sea at the time of the Declaration of Independence
in 1776, and traces the history of the emergence of the US 3-mile claim in a note
to the British minister in 1793 by the first US Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson,
and the general acceptance of the 3-mile belt 'throughout the world'. United
States v California, 332 U.S. 19, 32-33 (1946).
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although some legal questions were posed by the use of balloons and,
well before this, some theorists opined that rights of sovereignty or
property extended up to the heavens.
Once powered flight appeared in the early twentieth century, the
view quickly took hold that under international law 'airspace is part
of the legal r6gime of the subjacent territory'." From this perspective,
the law of the land would determine the regime of airspace above the
land, and the law of the sea would determine the regime of airspace
above the sea. The application of this approach is evident in the major
conventions on the subject.
The 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation 9 (Chicago
Convention) provides:
Article 1
The contracting States recognize that every State has complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
Article 2
For the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall
be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent
thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such state.
Article 12
Each contracting State undertakes to adopt measures to insure
that ... every aircraft carrying its nationality mark, wherever such
aircraft may be, shall comply with the rules and regulations
relating to the flight and maneuver of aircraft there in force.

8

9

This view was expressed by the sub-committee responsible for drafting the Paris
Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, 1919, 11 LNTS 173. See
Nicholas Grief, Public InternationalLaw in the Airspace of the High Seas
(Dordrecht/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), p 53 & note 42 citing JC Cooper,
Explorations in Aerospace Law, (1968), at 197. It should be noted that, insofar
as aviation is concerned, this approach generally did not prevail with respect
to private property rights under municipal law: aviation constitutes a notable
qualification of the maxim that property rights extend usque ad coelum.
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec 7, 1944, 15 UNTS 295 (hereinafter
Chicago Convention). Art 1 of the 1919 Paris Convention for the Regulation of
Aerial Navigation provided, 'The Contracting States recognise that every State
has complete and exclusive sovereignty in the airspace above its territory and

territorial waters.' 11 LNTS 173.
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... Over the high seas, the rules in force shall be those established
under this Convention. 0
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone"1 provides, 'The sovereignty of a coastal State extends
to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.'
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas"2 provides that the 'high
seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject
any part of them to its sovereignty' and expressly identifies '[f]reedom
to fly over the high seas' as one of the freedoms of the high seas.
These provisions are substantially repeated in the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea 3 (Law of the Sea Convention). Selected
provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention are appended to this paper
for ease of reference and context.
The sovereignty of the coastal state over the territorial sea is, and
has long been, subject to a right of innocent passage for ships of all
states. 4 It would seem, therefore, that if the underlying principle is
that 'airspace is part of the legal regime of the subjacent territory,"'
it might be logical to extend the right of innocent passage to aircraft
over the territorial sea. No such provision was made either in the 1944
6
Chicago Convention or, well before that, in the 1919 Paris Convention.
The absence of such provision in these conventions had a decisive
impact on state practice and on the International Law Commission
in drafting the provisions ultimately incorporated into the Territorial
Sea Convention.

10 This is a reference to the power of the ICAO Council, under Art 54(0, to adopt
international standards in accordance with Chapter VI of the Convention.
11 Art 2, Apr 29, 1958, 516 UNTS 205 (hereinafter Territorial Sea Convention).
12 Art 2, Apr 29, 1958, 450 UNTS 82.
13 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec 10,
1982, arts 2, 87 & 89, 1833 UNTS 397 (hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention).
Art 87's list of high seas freedoms refers to 'freedom of overflight' rather than
'freedom to fly over the high seas'. The change in drafting is not substantive;
it does however tend to reinforce the underlying view that the regime of the
relevant airspace is part of the regime of the high seas.
14 See, eg, Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 11, art 14; Law of the Sea
Convention, supra note 13, art 17.
15 See supra note 8.
16 See supra note 9. Art 2 of the 1919 Paris Convention did however provide, both
with respect to land territory and territorial waters, that each party 'undertakes
in time of peace to accord freedom of innocent passage above its territory to
the aircraft of the other contracting States'. This did not apply to state aircraft
(arts 32 & 33), to aircraft carrying arms and munitions of war (art 26), or to
third states (art 5), and was subject to other restrictions and unilateral regulations
(eg, arts 2, 3, 15, 27, 28).
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In effect, by the 1950s the Chicago Convention was sufficiently widely
accepted to suggest that the regime of the air was no longer entirely
derivative, but itself influenced the codification and progressive
development of the law of the sea. This is evident not only in the fact
that the International Law Commission in the 1950s made no provision
for a right of innocent passage for aircraft, but in the fact that the
articles it drafted that became part of the High Seas Convention do
not regulate freedom of overflight with anything approaching the detail
used with respect to freedom of navigation by ships.
It is often said that security concerns explain why aircraft were not
accorded a right of innocent passage over the territorial sea, particularly in light of the fact that the Chicago Convention and the Paris
Convention were both negotiated in the context of World Wars. It also
may be that the practical need to stay close to the coast for navigation
or safety reasons was generally more of a concern with respect to
ships than aircraft. Moreover, to the extent that there is a right for
civil aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air services to
fly over the land territory of a state under the Chicago Convention,
that right extends to its territorial waters as well. 7
Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind the underlying
assumptions regarding the legal geography of the sea. In 1919, in 1944,
and even in 1958, the principal maritime and aviation powers generally
assumed a maximum limit of three nautical miles for the territorial
sea. 18 If, in light of the 1951 decision of the International Court of Justice
in theAnglo-NorwegianFisheriescase, the maritime powers also accepted
the possibility of further extensions of sovereignty through straight
baselines in certain areas, 9 they did not regard such rules as extending
to vast archipelagoes lying astride major international routes.
Those who are familiar with the history of the Third UN Conference
on the Law of the Sea might be surprised to learn that the United
States evidenced scant interest in liberalizing the regime of innocent
passage in the territorial sea, including straits, in its comments to the
International Law Commission in the 1950s and its approach at the
1958 Geneva Conference. At that time, it assumed an immutable threemile position regarding the breadth of the territorial sea.

17
18

See Chicago Convention, supra note 9, art 5. In addition, scheduled services are
the object of an elaborate network of bilateral agreements.
Those, like the Soviet Union, that already claimed and recognized a 12-mile
territorial sea at times also implied that a different legal regime applied to

international straits.
19 See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 11, arts 4, 5(2); Law of the Sea
Convention, supra note 13, arts 7, 8(2).
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In brief, the concessions to territorial sovereignty at sea in the
Chicago Convention were believed to apply to a very narrow band
along the coast. The rest was assumed to be free 'high seas' subject
to regulation only by the ICAO Council binding only on civil aircraft.
With the notable exceptions of the Singapore and Sunda Straits and
the Strait of Tiran, most international straits were wider than six miles
and accordingly had high seas running through them if one assumed
a maximum territorial sea of three miles. The idea of sovereignty over
vast archipelagic waters was not considered in 1944, and was not
accepted at the 1958 Conference.
Moreover, in 1919, and even in 1944, much of the world's coast
outside the Western Hemisphere was under the control of European
powers who were themselves principal maritime and aviation powers.
There is little evidence that the implications for the law of the sea
and the law of the air of the vast decolonization to come were taken
into account by those who drafted the Chicago Convention or, it might
be said, by those who drafted the 1958 Geneva Conventions in the
midst of that process. It should be noted in this regard that roughly
twice the number of states attended the Third UN Conference on the
Law of the Sea from 1973 to 1982 as attended the Geneva Conference
in 1958; even fewer had significant influence over the draft articles
for the 1958 Conference submitted by the International Law Commission in 1956 after several years of work.
IV. THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
Under article 1 of the Chicago Convention, 'every State has complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.' Article
2 defines territory as 'land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto
under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State.'
Although the Chicago Convention states that it is not applicable
to state aircraft, its provisions in this regard are more complex, and
bear repetition:
Article 3
(a)
(b)
(c)

This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft,
and shall not be applicable to state aircraft.
Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall
be deemed to be state aircraft.
No state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the
territory of another State or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof.
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The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations
for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for
the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.

Thus, while its other provisions, including those concerning international standards and national regulation, do not apply to military
and other state aircraft, the Chicago Convention: (i) imposes an obligation
on the state of registry to require their state aircraft to have due regard
for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft, and (ii) requires consent
for the overflight by state aircraft of the territorial waters of another
state.2 0
With respect to overflight of the territory (including territorial waters)
of a state by civil aircraft, the Chicago Convention expressly requires
consent for scheduled international air service" and for overflight
without a pilot, 22 but grants a limited right to 'aircraft not engaged
in scheduled international air services ... to make flights into or in
transit non-stop across its territory and to make stops for non-traffic
purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior permission, and
subject to the right of the State flown over to require landing.' 23However,
the state flown over may prescribe routes or require permission for
such flights 'over regions which are inaccessible or without adequate
air navigation facilities.' 24 Moreover, the state flown over may 'for
reasons of military necessity or public safety' establish 'prohibited
areas ... of reasonable extent and location.' 25 It also may, 'with immediate
effect, temporarily ...26restrict or prohibit flying over the whole or any
part of its territory.'
With respect to regulation of overflight by civil aircraft, article 12
of the Chicago Convention imposes an obligation to 'comply with the
rules and regulations relating to the flight and maneuver of aircraft
there in force.' As previously noted, '[o]ver the high seas, the rules
in force shall be those established under this Convention,' that is to

20

21
22
23
24
25
26

As a strictly textual matter, it might be argued that art 2 of the Chicago
Convention, supra note 9, does not apply to state aircraft by virtue of art 3(a).
The argument would havedifficulty survivingwhat mycolleague Michael Graham
cheerfully calls 'the giggle test.' Art 2 defines a term that is used in a provision
of the very next article that does apply to state aircraft, namely art 3(c).
Chicago Convention, supra note 9, art 6.
Chicago Convention, supra note 9, art 8.
Chicago Convention, supra note 9, art 5.
Ibid.
Chicago Convention, supra note 9, art 9(a).
Chicago Convention, supra note 9, art 9(b).
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say those adopted by the ICAO Council pursuant to articles 37 and
54().27 They are to be found in the Rules of the Air, Annex 2 to the
Convention.
However, over its territory and territorial sea, a state is not strictly
required to apply the Rules of the Air. Under article 12, it is obliged
'to keep its own regulations in these respects uniform, to the greatest
possible extent, with those established from time to time under this
Convention.' 8 In this connection, article 38 requires a state to give
ICAO 'immediate notification ... of the differences between its own
practice and that established by [an] international standard.'
V. RENEGOTIATING THE LAW OF THE SEA
In general, it is reasonable to conclude that the received law of the
sea that formed the basis for the 1958 Conventions accommodated
coastal and non-coastal interests by the use of a summa divisio: the
line between the territorial sea and the high seas. As illustrated clearly
in the Chicago Convention itself, on one side the coastal state has
substantial and often complete control. On the other side, it has none.
However, in fact this received law was more refined than the Chicago
Convention suggests. Within the territorial sea, ships enjoyed a right
of innocent passage. Seaward of the territorial sea, the 1958 Conventions accorded the coastal state limited enforcement rights for such
matters as smuggling and immigration control in a contiguous zone
extending up to 12 miles from the coastal baselines, and rights in a
much broader area over exploration of the seabed and subsoil of the
continental shelf and exploitation of its natural resources.
The approach of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea
was substantially more refined. While the regimes of the territorial
sea and the high seas are retained in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,
they are far from the whole story: new regimes are added to moderate
their effect both landward and seaward of the outer limit of the territorial
sea, and new environmental obligations are imposed on all of the sea.
In general these changes greatly expand coastal state control over
the sea but, at the same time, preserve to a very considerable extent
(and in some instances expand) the communications rights and free-

27
28

Art 37(c) refers explicitly to 'Rules of the air and air traffic control practices'.
Emphasis added. In addition, art 37 provides: 'Each contracting State undertakes
to collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in
regulations, standards, procedures, and organization in relation to aircraft ...
in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation.'
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doms enjoyed under the previously received regimes. This includes
rights and freedoms of overflight. To put the matter as clearly and
unambiguously as possible, a consensus on the rules regarding traditional uses of the sea set forth in the Law of the Sea Convention,
and its subsequent widespread ratification, simply would not have
occurred if the effect were to radically reduce the areas in which all
states enjoy navigation and overflight rights and freedoms without the
need for obtaining the consent of the coastal state and without unilateral
regulation by that state.
From the perspective of overflight rights and freedoms, there are
four significant developments in the Law of the Sea Convention:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

in Part II, it establishes a maximum permissible breadth of
twelve nautical miles from the coastal baselines for the
territorial sea;2 9
in Part V and related provisions, it elaborates a new regime
of the exclusive economic zone seaward of the territorial
sea extending up to 200 nautical miles from the coastal
baselines; 0
in Part III and related provisions, it deals with the regime
of straits overlapped by territorial seas (and certain internal
waters) separately from the regime of the territorial sea in
Part II and establishes a new regime of transit passage for
3
most straits used for international navigation; '
in Part IV and related provisions, it elaborates a new regime
of archipelagic waters enclosed by archipelagic baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured,
and deals separately with the regime of passage through
32
archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea.

They will be addressed first in the context of the references to
territorial waters in the Chicago Convention, and then in the context
of its references to the high seas.

29
30
31

32

Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 3.
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, Part V.
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, Part Ill. 'The 1982 Convention ... makes
it very clear that passage through straits used for international navigation is
to be governed solely by Part Ill, and not by Part ii.' Hugo Caminos, 'The Legal
R6gime of Straits in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea',
(1987-V) 205 Rec Cours 9, 123 (hereinafter referred to as Caminos).
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, Part IV.
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A. Territorial Waters under the Chicago Convention
The Law of the Sea Convention has two effects on article 2 of the Chicago
Convention.33 First, it clarifies the geographic meaning of the reference
to 'territorial waters'. Second, it qualifies the assimilation of territorial
waters to land territory in the context of overflight of straits and
archipelagic waters and, to that extent, clarifies the functional meaning
of the reference to 'territorial waters'.
(i) The Territorial Sea, Internal Waters and Archipelagic Waters
As to the geographic meaning of 'territorial waters' in the context
of the reference to 'land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto'
in article 2 of the Chicago Convention, the term logically embraces
not only the territorial sea but waters landward of the baselines from
which the territorial sea is measured, long denominated internal waters
and now denominated either internal waters or archipelagic waters.
Article 2 of the Law of the Sea Convention provides in pertinent part:
The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and
internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic
waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.
Excluding waters landward of the baselines would make no sense
since, under the Chicago Convention, the same regime applies both
seaward and landward of those waters. As a textual matter, given the
choice between regarding such waters as either territorial waters or
land areas under article 2, it is certainly more plausible to regard them
as territorial waters, particularly in light of the vast expanse of some
archipelagic waters.
Because it is now clear that the territorial sea may not extend
seaward of 12 nautical miles from baselines established in accordance
with the Law of the Sea Convention, it should be equally clear that
'territorial waters' referred to in article 2 of the Chicago Convention
also cannot extend seaward of that limit.
(ii) The Exclusive Economic Zone
To the extent that any question might be raised on this point, it
would presumably relate to the regime of the exclusive economic zone 4
In this context, it should be borne in mind that the term 'territorial

33
34

The text accompanies note 9 supra.
In areas of straits beyond the territorial sea, the regime of the high seas or
the exclusive economic zone would apply. See infra note 38 and accompanying
text.
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waters' is defined as part of the territory of a state by article 2 of
the Chicago Convention, and pursuant to article 1 of that Convention
refers to an areawhere 'every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the airspace.' That simply does not describe the exclusive economic
zone regime elaborated by Part V of the Law of the Sea Convention.
Article 58(1) expressly accords all states freedom of navigation and
overflight in the exclusive economic zone. The exclusive economic
zone 'is an area beyond ... the territorial sea.'35 While the coastal state
enjoys enumerated sovereign rights and jurisdiction for resource
management and other specific purposes, it is not accorded sovereignty
in the exclusive economic zone.36 Quite to the contrary, the prohibition
on claims of sovereignty in article 89 applies to the exclusive economic
zone pursuant to article 58(2). There is no need to belabor the point
3
further. 1
(iii) Transit Passage of Straits
The provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention regarding straits
unquestionably affect waters subject to the sovereignty of the coastal
state. That is their purpose. Indeed, the entire Part of the Convention
dealing with straits used for international navigation 'does not apply
... if there exists through the strait a route through the high seas or
through an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience with respect
to navigational and hydrographical characteristics; in such routes, the
other relevant parts of this Convention, including the provisions regarding
the freedoms of navigation and overflight, apply.'3
Article 34 of the Law of the Sea Convention specifies that the 'regime
of passage through straits used for international navigation ... shall
35
36

37

38

Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 55.
See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 55-58. Art 59 leaves to ad
hoc determination the question of whether the right to conduct and control
a particular activity not specifically allocated by the Convention will be enjoyed
by the coastal state or by all states.
Art 2 of the Chicago Convention, drafted before the massive decolonization that
began after World War II, provides that 'the territory of a State shall be deemed
to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty,
suzerainty, protection or mandate of such state.'The words 'suzerainty, protection
or mandate' refer to the status of the land areas and the territorial waters
adjacent thereto, not to the status of the waters alone. Those words largely
reflect the legal classifications a colonial system that has passed. They have
nothing whatever to do the with the status of the exclusive economic zone.
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 36. Art 35 provides, 'Nothing in
this Part [Part III, Straits Used for International Navigation] affects ... the legal

status of the waters beyond the territorial seas of States bordering straits as
exclusive economic zones or high seas.'
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not in other respects affect the legal status of the waters forming such
straits or the exercise by the States bordering the straits of their
sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters and their air space, bed
and subsoil.' 'In other respects' waters within the baselines retain their
status as internal waters, and waters seaward of the baselines, up to
a maximum limit of 12 nautical miles, retain their status as territorial
sea. But the key words are 'in other respects'. The regime of passage
through such straits does affect their legal status with respect to
passage itself. As article 34 goes on to explain, the 'sovereignty or
jurisdiction of the States bordering the straits is exercised subject to
this Part and to other rules of international law.'
Section 2 of Part III of the Law of the Sea Convention elaborates
a new right of transit passage enjoyed by 'all ships and aircraft'39 in
'straits which are used for international navigation between one part
of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.'40 Transit passage is
defined as 'the exercise in accordance with this Part of the freedom
of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and
expeditious transit of the strait ... ,41 States bordering straits may not
42
hamper or suspend transit passage.
It is evident that the air space over the territorial sea or internal
waters 43 in straits in which there is a right of transit passage is not,
in the words of article 1 of the Chicago Convention, subject to the
'complete and exclusive sovereignty' of the coastal state. In the words
of article 2 of that Convention, such straits are not 'under the sovereignty' of the coastal state '[f]or the purposes of this Convention'

39
40

41
42
43

This expressly includes state aircraft. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note
13, art 39(3)(a).
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 37-38. This does not affect the
legal regime in straits in which passage is regulated by long-standing international
conventions specifically relating to such straits (such as the Turkish Straits).
Ibid, art 35(c). The regime of passage in certain straits between an island and
the mainland where there is a route of similar convenience seaward of the
territorial sea of the island, and in straits used for international navigation
between a part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and the territorial
sea of a foreign state, is limited to non-suspendable innocent passage for ships.
Ibid, arts 38(1), 45.
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 38(2).
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 44.
The regime of straits used for international navigation extends to internal waters
not previously considered as such that are created by a system of straight
baselines. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 35(a). The same result
applies to the regime of innocent passage outside such straits. Ibid, art 8(2).

4 SJICL

Transit of Straits and Archipelagic Waters by Military Aircraft

391

insofar as international aviation in transit passage through such straits
is concerned. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that most of the
affected straits had high seas running through them with a maximum
limit of three miles for the territorial sea (ordinarily measured from
the coast itself) that was widely assumed in 1944 when the Chicago
Convention was concluded. Thus, the regime of transit passage preserves to a significant degree the anticipated legal effect of articles
1 and 2 of the Chicago Convention at the time it was negotiated. In
addition, it is clear that the Chicago Convention did not seek to determine
the underlying legal status of the sea and the airspace above the sea.
It relied on the law of the sea to do so,
The most appropriate means for reconciling the two Conventions
is to interpret the words 'territorial waters' in article 2 as not applying
to straits used for international navigation with respect to the exercise
of the right of transit passage. The words would however apply to
other flights over such straits. Alternatively, one can of course reach
the same result by applying the 'later in time' rule articulated in article
30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. But application
of that rule itself turns on compatibility of the provisions of the earlier
treaty with the later one. Viewed only in the context of the Chicago
Convention, the Law of the Sea Convention would itself constitute the
authorization required by article 3(c) of the Chicago Convention
(and comparable provisions regarding civil aircraft) and the exclusive
source of the relevant obligations during transit. That approach, however,
does not reflect fully the role of the Law of the Sea Convention as
the basic organizing instrument of public international law for the sea
that has been aptly called a Constitution for the Oceans. 44 It would
seem to make most sense to interpret the Chicago Convention in a
manner compatible with the Law of the Sea Convention, in particular
because the latter Convention is both widely ratified 4 and widely
regarded as generally declaratory of the customary international law
4
of the sea. 1
44

Tommy TB Koh, A Constitution for the Oceans, UN Pub Sales No E 83 V 5,

45

p xxxiii (1983) (immediately preceding the text of the Law of the Sea Convention
as originally published by the United Nations).
There were 135 parties listed by the UN web site on April 23 2001.
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los>.
'The sources of international air law- in particular the Convention on International

46

Civil Aviation and the Annexes thereto as well as other international air law
instruments - frequently refer or are applicable to the airspace above different

areas of the sea; however, these instruments do not define the terms of the
international law of the sea but take the basic concepts of the law of the sea
from general international law'. ICAO Secretariat, United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea - Implications, if any, for the Application of the Chicago
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(iv) Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage
Part IV of the Law of the Sea Convention provides both for the
sovereignty of the archipelagic state over a new category of waters
called 'archipelagic waters' and for limitations on the exercise of that
sovereignty, including a new 'right of archipelagic sea lanes passage'
for 'all ships and aircraft'. Most of the relevant provisions governing
transit passage of straits are either copied or incorporated by reference
into the provisions regarding archipelagic sea lanes passage. For the
same reasons discussed in connection with transit passage of straits,
it would make sense to interpret the words 'territorial waters' in article
2 of the Chicago Convention as not applying to archipelagic waters
and the adjacent territorial sea with respect to the exercise of the
right of archipelagic sea lanes passage through such waters, be it
through sea lanes and air routes designated for this purpose or, in
their absence, through routes normally used for international navigation." The words 'territorial waters' in article 2 would however apply
to other flights over archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial
sea, including sea lanes and air routes.
It may be noted that transit passage is defined as 'freedom of
navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and
expeditious transit of the strait' while archipelagic sea lanes passage
is defined as 'the exercise ... of the rights of navigation and overflight
in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious
and unobstructed transit' between points outside archipelagic waters
and the adjacent territorial sea. 8 This difference is of no consequence
in the present context. Given the fact that there may be several sea
lanes and air routes through a given archipelago, and that each of
the sea lanes and air routes may in effect be up to 50 nautical miles
wide,49 archipelagic states such as Indonesia - whose interest in the

47

Convention, its Annexes and other International Air Law Instruments, Attachment
to State letter LE 4/41 - 84/33, para 2.1 (1984), ICAO doc C-WP/7777 (1084,
mimeo.), reproduced as LC/26-WP/5-1 (1985, mimeo), in (1987) 3 NILOS YB 243
(hereinafter ICAO Secretariat Study). Much of the study reflects the analysis
by Michael Milde in his article, 'United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea - Possible Implications for International Air Law', (1983) 8 Annals of Air &
Space L 167 (hereinafter cited as Milde).
See Law of the Sea Convention, supranote 13, art 53. Where relevant, presumably
the same result would apply to the preservation of 'existing rights and all other
legitimate interests' of an immediately adjacent neighboring state parts of whose
territory is separated by the archipelagic waters of its neighbor. See ibid, art

47(6).
48
49

Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 38(2), 53(3).
See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 53(5).
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concept related in important respects to enhancing national unity were uncomfortable with the possible political implications of using
the word 'freedom' to describe a regime applicable to vast areas within
and, of necessity, fully dividing the archipelago. For their part, certain
maritime powers such as the United States regarded the inclusion not
only of the word 'unobstructed' but of the clause 'in the normal mode'
in the definition of the right itself rather than, as in straits, in the
context of a flag state obligation) 0 as an important reminder regarding
the operation of naval task forces employing defensive screens, evasive
tactics, air cover and submerged submarines through the vast areas
involved."1
(v) Result
The result then is that the provisions of the Chicago Convention
and related instruments that apply only to the territory of a state
(including its territorial waters) do not apply seaward of the territorial
sea and do not apply to transit passage of straits or to archipelagic
sea lanes passage.
For state aircraft, the effect is relatively simple. The need for
authorization to fly over the territory of another State under article
3(c) of the Chicago Convention does not apply beyond the territorial
sea or to transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage. On the
other hand, the obligation of due regard for the safety of navigation
of civil aircraft under article 3(d) of the Chicago Convention does apply:
it is not limited to overflight of foreign territory and is compatible
with the Law of the Sea Convention, including the obligation at all
times to operate with due regard for the safety of navigation under
articles 39(3) and 54 thereof. Similarly, the statement in article 3(a)
that the Chicago Convention is not applicable to state aircraft applies:
it as well is not limited to overflight of foreign territory and is not
only compatible with the Law of the Sea Convention but is reflected
in the drafting of article 39(3) thereof.
For civil aircraft, the effect is somewhat more complex because the
Chicago Convention does apply to them. The approach however is
the same. Provisions of the Chicago Convention and related instruments that apply only to the territory of a state (including its territorial
waters) do not apply to civil aircraft beyond the territorial sea or in

50
51

See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 39(1)(c), 54.
See infra note 83 and accompanying text. This question is analyzed by the author
in Bernard H Oxman, 'The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea: the 1966 New York Session', (1978) 72 AJIL 57, 66.
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transit passage of straits or archipelagic sea lanes passage. Thus, for
example, the provisions regarding prohibited areas and temporary
restrictions on overflight under article 9 of the Chicago Convention
would not apply. Similarly the requirement in article 6 for authorization
for scheduled international air service would not apply.
The question then is which provisions and regulations apply. This
brings us back to article 12 of the Chicago Convention and its reference
to the 'high seas' as well as to the requirement of articles 39(3) and
54 of the Law of the Sea Convention that civil aircraft in transit passage
or archipelagic sea lanes passage shall observe the ICAO Rules of the
Air and that state aircraft in transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes
passage will normally comply with such safety measures.
B. The High Seas under the Chicago Convention
The basic question posed is whether the provisions of the Chicago
Convention, as they apply on the high seas, are applicable to freedom
of overflight in the exclusive economic zone, transit passage of straits
and archipelagic sea lanes passage.
(i)

The Exclusive Economic Zone

The Law of the Sea Convention does not limit freedom of overflight
to transit either in the exclusive economic zone or on the high seas
beyond. This freedom is however both protected and limited by the
duty set forth in article 87 to exercise high seas freedoms with due
regard to the exercise by other states of their high seas freedoms;
that duty is integral to a public order rooted in universal freedoms
and is incorporated into the regime of the exclusive economic zone
by necessary implication reinforced by the express cross-reference
in article 58(1) to freedoms 'referred to in article 87'. Any state,
including the coastal state, may be either the subject or object of
that duty in the exclusive economic zone.
Insofar as activities other than (or in addition to) overflight are
concerned, while the issue is unlikely to arise very often, it may be
assumed that aircraft, like ships, must respect the rights of the coastal
state in the exclusive economic zone set forth in article 56 of the Law
of the Sea Convention. This includes its sovereign rights over the
exploration and exploitation of natural resources and its jurisdiction
52
over marine scientific research.

52

See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 56, 246; Francisco Orrego
Vicufia, The Exclusive Economic Zone, (1989) at 106-108. With respect to the
distinction between commercial exploration, marine scientific research and
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In exercising their freedoms and rights in the zone, States must
'have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State.'5 3 The
rights that are the object of this 'due regard' duty under article 58
are those granted exclusively to the coastal state by article 56 (and
the provisions to which article 56 refers); they do not include a political
or military interest in avoiding the presence of the aircraft. These rights
are the subject of the parallel duty of the coastal state under article
56(2) to 'have due regard to the rights and duties of other States' and
to 'act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention';
the freedoms and rights of all states under article 58 are the object
of this duty.
Ships and aircraft also must 'comply with the laws and regulations
adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are
not incompatible with' the provisions regarding the exclusive economic
zone; this would include, for example, a law regulating exploration
and exploitation of natural resources, marine scientific research, or
dumping.14 However, unlike freedom of navigation by ships - which
is subject in the exclusive economic zone to elaborate regulatory
provisions set forth in the high seas regime and the environmental
chapter of the Convention" - apart from general matters such as piracy,
no provision of the Convention addresses regulation of freedom of
overflight as such either on the high seas or in the exclusive economic
zone,5 much less authorizes the coastal state to adopt laws and regulations
for this purpose in the zone.

53
54

55
56

other information gathering, see Bernard H Oxman, 'The Regime of Warships
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea' (1984) 24 Va J Int'l
L 809, 844-47 an English adaptation of the author's analysis in (1982) 28 Ann
Fr Dr Int 811 (hereinafter cited as Oxman, Warships).
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 58(3).
Ibid. The practice of discharging fuel before landing for safety reasons would
not appear to be 'dumping' for purposes of the Law of the Sea Convention: its
definition of 'dumping' excludes 'the disposal of wastes or other matter incidental
aircraft'. Law of the Sea Convention,
to, or derived from the normal operations of ...
supra note 13, arts 1(1)(5)(b)(i), 210, 216.
See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 58(2), 90-115, 211, 217-221.
Pursuant to arts 212 and 222, the state of registry of the aircraft adopts and
enforces laws and regulations to control pollution from or through the atmosphere.
The coastal state also has such competence in its internal waters, archipelagic
waters and the territorial sea. However, pursuant to art 233, 'nothing in ss 5,
6 and 7 [of Part XII, which includes arts 212 and 2221 affects the legal rbgime
of straits.' Given the fact that there is no express reference to archipelagic waters
or archipelagic sea lanes passage in any of Part XII, one would rely on the
structure of the Convention to conclude that the same rule applies to archipelagic
sea lanes passage as well. Moreover, art 235 provides that the 'provisions of
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Insofar as the nature of overflight rights beyond the territorial sea
is concerned, there is no difference between the provisions of the Law
of the Sea Convention concerning the exclusive economic zone and
those concerning the high seas beyond. Both refer to freedom of
overflight.57 Unlike the 1958 High Seas Convention, the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention contains no geographic definition of the high seas.
Article 86 applies the high seas regime to all parts of the sea beyond
the exclusive economic zone, but expressly states that it 'does not
entail any abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed by all States in the
exclusive economic zone in accordance with article 58.' Freedom of
overflight and other freedoms of all states in the exclusive economic
zone are expressly identified in article 58(1) as 'the freedoms referred
to in article 87.' Article 87 is the basic provision identifying the freedoms
of the high seas. As this author indicated during the negotiation of
the Convention, 8 one of the reasons the United States suggested this
cross-reference to article 87 during the negotiations in the so-called
'Castaneda-Vindeness Group' regarding the provisions dealing with the
status of the exclusive economic zone was to make clear that the nature
of the freedoms preserved in the exclusive economic zone is qualitatively the same as on the high seas beyond and subject to international
regulation in the same way, in particular with respect to the regulation

57
58

this Convention regarding the protection and preservation of the marine
environment do not apply to any ... aircraft owned or operated by a State and
used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service.'
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 58(1), 87.
See Bernard H Oxman, 'An Analysis of the Exclusive Economic Zone as formulated in the Informal Composite Negotiating Text', in Thomas A Clingan, ed, Law
of the Sea: State Practice in Zones of Special Jurisdiction,(1979) (Proceedings

of the Thirteenth Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute) at 57, 68:
Art 87 is the basic article listing the freedoms of the high seas. Therefore,
the cross-reference to art 87 establishes the qualitative identity of freedom
of navigation, overflight and laying submarine cable and pipelines in the
exclusive economic zone and on the high seas beyond. High seas law determines
the meaning of art 58, subject of course to the express limitations on the
application of that law within that article.
This cross reference to art 87 makes clear that treaties regulating these
freedoms on the high seas apply in the same way to the exercise of these
freedoms in the exclusive economic zone. In particular, the cross reference
was intended to make clear that art 12 of the Chicago Convention on Civil
Aviation applies in exactly the same way to freedom of overflight within the
exclusive economic zone as it applies to freedom of overflight beyond the
exclusive economic zone. The reference to the high seas in art 12 of the
Chicago Convention should be read as a reference to freedom of overflight
in the modern law of the sea.
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of overflight under the Chicago Convention, including article 12 thereof.
Moreover, apart from provisions dealing specifically with fisheries,
article 58(2) incorporates by reference into the regime of the exclusive
economic zone all the remaining provisions of the high seas regime
'in so far as they are not incompatible with' the provisions regarding
the exclusive economic zone.
The question is not whether the exclusive economic zone is or is
not high seas in some abstract sense. The question is whether the
freedom of overflight in the exclusive economic zone is in principle
the same freedom of overflight that obtains on the high seas beyond.
The answer to that question is 'yes'. In effect, the received high seas
freedom of overflight is preserved by the Law of the Sea Convention
in its regimes of the exclusive economic zone and of the high seas.
Accordingly, '... for the purposes of the Chicago Convention, its Annexes
and other air law instruments, the EEZ should be deemed to have the
same legal status as the high seas and any reference in these instruments to the high seas should be deemed to encompass the EEZ.' 9
'[T]he same right of freedom of navigation is enjoyed by aircraft over
the EEZ as is enjoyed by aircraft over the high seas, which is the plain
meaning of Articles 58 and 87 of UNCLOS. It would follow that, as a
consequence of Articles 58 and 87 of UNCLOS, the Rules of the Air
applying over the EEZ are to be identical with those applying over
the high seas.' 60

59
60

ICAO Secretariat Study, supra note 46, para 11.12.
Report by the Rapporteur of the ICAO Council's Legal Committee (Mr AWG
Kean, CBE), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - Implications,

if any, for the Application of the Chicago Convention, its Annexes and other
International Air Law Instruments, para 33, Attachment to ICAO Doc C-WP/8077
(1985, mimeo), reproduced in (1987) 3 NILOS YB 262 (hereinafter cited as ICAO
Rapporteur).
It is, therefore, beyond doubt (in your Rapporteur's opinion) that Art 58 of

UNCLOS, by applying Art 87 to the right of overflight over the EEZ and using
language characteristic of high seas rights, equates the EEZ with the high
seas as regards freedom of overflight and is quite incompatible with the
suggestion made in the comments of one State [Brazil] that 'an effort should
be made in the context of the Chicago system to give the EEZ the same
conditions as those applicable to land territory and territorial waters with
respect to overflight, as provided for in Art 5 of the Chicago Convention (and
in IASTA)'. Such a suggestion would, in your Rapporteur's view, require an
amendment of UNCLOS.
Ibid, para 29. See Barbara Kwiatkowska, The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone
in the New Law of the Sea, 203 (Dordrecht/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989).
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Transit Passage of Straits

Early in the informal negotiations that led to the Third UN Conference
on the Law of the Sea, the United States, with the support of the Soviet
Union and others, suggested the maintenance of a high seas corridor
through straits used for international navigation for transit purposes.
This approach raised concerns about regulation of activities other than
transit of straits. In response to these concerns, the idea of a high
seas corridor was dropped in favor of a regime of free transit, which
ultimately evolved into the right of transit passage in articles drafted
by an informal group convened by the United Kingdom and Fiji. However,
the idea was retained that navigation and overflight in transit through
straits would be subject, not to the conditions otherwise applicable
in the territorial sea, but to conditions similar to those applicable
beyond the territorial sea.
In particular, only international regulations (or, in the case of sea
lanes and traffic separation schemes, internationally approved regulations) apply to the regulation of transit by ships and aircraft for
pollution and safety purposes. Apart from the right of the straits state
to regulate activities other than transit, proposals permitting straits
states to adopt their own regulations were rejected. Thus, ships in
transit passage must comply with generally accepted international
regulations for safety at sea, including the International Regulations
for Preventing Collisions at Sea, while aircraft in transit passage (apart
from state aircraft) must observe the ICAO Rules of the Air.
This result follows from the analysis of the Chicago Convention itself.
If, as previously discussed, the provisions of the Chicago Convention
and related measures applicable only to flight over the territory of
a state do not apply to transit passage of straits, what is left under
the structure of the Convention are the international standards, in
particular the rules 'relating to the flight and maneuver of aircraft ...
established under this Convention' referred to in article 12. These are

6
the Rules of the Air. '

In this connection, the British delegation, which was co-chair of
the informal group that drafted the straits articles, stated in the relevant
Conference Working Group that the relevant part of the Rules of the
Air 'is that relating to the high seas.'6 In 1976, the United States stated
61
62

The Rules of the Air, while mandatory on the high seas, of course also may apply
to flight over the territory of states that have not notified ICAO of differences
under art 38.
See Satya N Nandan & David H Anderson, 'Straits Used for International Navigation: A Commentary on Part II of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea 1982', (1989) BYBIL 159, 185 (hereinafter cited as Nandan &Anderson).
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at the Conference that the 'Rules of the Air referred to are the ICAO
rules as they apply to the high seas.'6 3 This interpretative statement
'apparently received no objections.'"
The provisions of the Chicago Convention and standards adopted
thereunder regulating flight over the high seas are properly interpreted
to apply in the same way to civil aircraft in transit passage of straits.
In this context, it should be borne in mind that the Law of the Sea
Convention adds a new obligation for state aircraft not explicitly contained
in the Chicago Convention. They 'will normally comply with' the safety
measures contained in the Rules of the Air.6" Moreover, the provision
of article 39(2) of the Law of the Sea Convention, to the effect that
state aircraft 'will at all times operate with due regard for the safety
of navigation' appears, at least as a purely textual matter, to impose
a stricter obligation and have a broader object than that contained
in article 3(d) of the Chicago Convention.
The reason that state aircraft are not invariably subject to the Rules
of the Air, while all ships are required by the Law of the Sea Convention
to comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for safety at sea, relates in important respects
to the distinct competencies and traditions of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) and ICAO.
IMO does not have regulatory powers comparable to the broad
powers of the ICAO Council. Binding regulation generally emerges from
treaties negotiated under IMO auspices. Where relevant, the particular
needs of warships have traditionally been taken into account in this
work. It was especially important for the Law of the Sea Convention
to 'close the gap' in ratification of IMO safety conventions by requiring
respect for the regulations contained therein that are 'generally accepted'.
This obligation is not limited to straits and archipelagic waters.66

63
64

65
66

4 Renate Platz6der, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
Documents 1973-1982 (1983), 360.
Caminos, supra note 31, p 161, note 373. The statements were presumably
designed to eliminate a possible argument that there is a renvoi in Rule 2.1.1
of Annex 2 to 'the rules published by the State having jurisdiction over the
territory overflown.' See ICAO Rapporteur, supra note 56, para 16, concluding
that such an application of Rule 2.1.1 'would defeat the apparent purpose of
Art 39.3(a)' of the Law of the Sea Convention 'to produce uniformity over straits.'
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 39(3)(a).
See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 21(4) (innocent passage),
arts 39(2)(a) & 54 (transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage), arts
58(2) & 94(5) (freedom of navigation in the exclusive economic zone and on
the high seas).
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The Chicago Convention is very widely ratified. Under that Convention, ICAO has broad regulatory powers, especially with respect
to overflight of the high seas, but those powers do not extend to military
aircraft. For that reason, ICAO regulations need not be drafted to take
into account the particular needs of military aircraft. Thus, there are
problems, such as those associated with flight plans, flight control,
and two-way communication, that make compliance with ICAO regulations in all circumstances difficult in the case of military aircraft.
One of the few amendments to the Law of the Sea Convention pressed
to a formal vote was Spain's proposal to delete the word 'normally'
so that state aircraft would be bound at all times to comply with the
Rules of the Air. The proposal was defeated by a vote of 21 for, 55
against, and 60 abstentions.67 In connection with its signature of the
Convention (and maintained on ratification), Spain declared, "With
regard to article 39, paragraph 3, it takes the word 'normally' to mean
'except in cases of force majeure or distress'." That is not what the
text says. The absence of those words is especially significant in the
particular context of article 39, which uses those very words of exception
in another paragraph where that is what is meant.6 '[T]his paragraph
of the Declaration seems directed at modifying the overflight provisions
of the transit passage regime; something which could not be accomplished throughout UNCLOS Ill.'1 9
The Spanish and other concerned governments were well aware
that the reason for the word 'normally' relates primarily to situations
in which there is a need to provide air cover for transiting ships or
a need to protect the security of the aircraft or the mission, determinations that the state undertaking the mission is alone competent

67

68

69

Even the abstentions have some negative implication. Rule 39, paragraph 1, of
the Conference Rules of Procedure provides, 'Decisions of the Conference on
all matters of substance ... shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the
representatives present and voting, provided that such majority shall include
at least a majority of the States participating in that session of the Conference.'
It is interesting that in the context of an article that uses 'shall' in all other
contexts, the word 'will' is used in the context of the duty of state aircraft
normally to comply with the safety measures in the Rules of the Air and to have
due regard to the safety of navigation. The same distinction is to be found in
art 3 of the Chicago Convention, which uses the word 'shall' in all other contexts,
but the word 'will' in paragraph (d) in connection with the duty of state aircraft
to have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.
Caminos, supra note 31, p 229. Yturriaga replies, "The Spanish declaration does
not try to delete the word 'normally' by the back door, but to give a pro domo
interpretation of what can be considered as 'abnormal'," Jos6 A de Yturriaga,
Straits UsedforinternationalNavigation,A SpanishPerspective, p 2 3 2 (Dordrecht/

Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) (hereinafter cited as Yturriaga).
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to make. This type of concern is also reflected more generally in article
302, which provides that 'nothing in this Convention shall be deemed
to require a State Party, in the fulfilment of its obligations under this
Convention, to supply information the disclosure of which is contrary
to the essential interests of its security.' 0
(iii)

Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage

As previously noted, most of the relevant provisions governing
transit passage of straits are either copied or incorporated by reference
into the provisions regarding archipelagic sea lanes passage. For the
same reasons discussed in connection with transit passage of straits,
the provisions of the Chicago Convention and standards adopted
thereunder regulating flight over the high seas are properly interpreted
to apply in the same way to civil aircraft in archipelagic sea lanes
passage. The rule that state aircraft 'will normally comply with' the
safety measures contained in the Rules of the Air is among those
incorporated by reference into the provisions regarding archipelagic
sea lanes passage.

(iv) Result
The result then is that the provisions of the Chicago Convention
and related instruments applicable to the high seas, apply in the
exclusive economic zone and to transit passage of straits and archipelagic sea lanes passage as they apply on the high seas.
VI. ACTIVITIES DURING TRANSIT OF STRAITS AND
ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS

Although they would apply in any event, the 'principles of international
law embodied in' the UN Charter regarding the threat or use of force
are repeated and incorporated by reference into article 301 with respect
to the exercise of all rights and performance of all duties under the
Law of the Sea Convention,72 and in specific provisions as well, such
as those regulating transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage;73
70
71
72
73

Art 302 is analyzed by the author in Oxman, Warships, supra note 52, at 822.
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 54.
Its implications are analyzed by the author in Oxman, Warships, supra note 52,
at 814-815.
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 39(1)(b), 54. The inclusion of
a reference to 'sovereignty' in addition to territorial integrity and political
independence in this context (and art 19) would not appear to alter the substance.
Surely, it could not be understood to establish an a contrario interpretation of
the obligations of states in other areas or contexts.
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they are also implicitly incorporated by provisions such as article 88,
which reserves the high seas for 'peaceful purposes' and applies to
4
the exclusive economic zone pursuant to article 58(2).1
In his transmittal of the Law of the Sea Convention to the US Senate
for its advice and consent, the President of the United States included
a Commentary on the Convention (US Commentary). It contained the
following statement regarding the provisions referred to in the previous
paragraph:
None of these provisions creates new rights or obligations, imposes
restraints upon military operations, or impairs the inherent right of selfdefense, enshrined in article 51 of the United Nations Charter. More
generally, military activities which are consistent with the principles of
international law are not prohibited by these, or any other, provisions
of the Convention. 75
Unlike the broader rights and freedoms of all states in the exclusive
economic zone and the high seas, the right of transit passage and the
right of archipelagic sea lanes passage are limited to the purpose of
continuous and expeditious transit.7 6 Ships and aircraft must proceed
without delay.77 They are required to 'refrain from any activities other
than those incident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress.'7 8
'Any activity which is not an exercise of the right of transit passage
through a strait remains subject to the other applicable provisions
of [the] Convention.' 79 The Convention accords foreign states no right
to conduct activities in the territorial sea other than innocent passage,
8s
transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage.
What constitutes 'delay' and what constitutes the normal mode of
continuous and expeditious transit for military aircraft depends upon
the circumstances. Military aircraft may transit alone or in squadron

The author's analysis of the 'peaceful purposes' clause can be found in Oxman,
Warships, supra note 70, at 829.
75 Commentary accompanying Message from the President of the United States
transmitting the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI to the United States Senate
for its advice and consent, Oct 7, 1994, Sen Treaty Doc 103-39, p 94 (1994),
reprinted in 34 ILM 1441 (1995) (cited hereinafter as US Commentary).
76 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 38(2), 53(3).
77 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 39(1)(a), 54.
78 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 39(1)(b), 54.
79 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 38(3).
80 The right to enter a port or other waters of a state in cases of danger or distress
is governed by customary international law.
74
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formation. Helicopters or fixed wing aircraft also may accompany
warships in transit in a defensive mode. This is one reason why military
overflight is not restricted to prescribed altitudes and why the air routes
across archipelagic waters must be above the archipelagic sea lanes. 8'
It is in the interests of neither the transiting state nor the coastal
state to present an unusually tempting target for third states or others.
In principle, it is to be expected that naval and air forces in transit
will take normal defensive precautions against attack. For security as
well as navigation purposes, they may, for example, communicate by
radio, use radar or sonar, and, where circumstances permit, travel
in defensive formation and use defensive maneuvers. If ships and
aircraft are traveling in a group for normal defensive purposes, total
transit time will be limited by the slowest unit.
Yturriaga writes:
The flight of aircraft to or from its carrier cannot be considered as a
'normal mode of continuous and expeditious transit', apart from being
forbidden under paragraph 1(b) of article 39. The text of paragraph 1(c)
is not definitive as [to] what activities are incident to the normal mode
of transit, but the appropriate interpretation
would be one of 'reason82
ableness' under the circumstances.
For the launching and recovery of aircraft from its carrier to be
'forbidden under paragraph 1(b) or article 39', one must assume that
it invariably constitutes a threat or use of force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of the straits state. That
is simply not true. These activities occur at sea all the time. Neither
in straits nor in other waters do they constitute an unlawful threat
or use of force as such.
There is of course no need to quarrel in the abstract with
Yturriaga's assertion of a standard of 'reasonableness' for interpreting paragraph 1(c). The difficulty is his implicit factual assumption
that launching and recovering aircraft is never a normal mode of
continuous and expeditious transit. That assumption is not correct.
Under Yturriaga's own proffered test, whether it is reasonable would
depend on the circumstances.
The US Commentary on the Convention contains the following
statement twice, once regarding transit passage and once regarding
archipelagic sea lanes passage:

81
82

Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 53(1).
Yturriaga, supra note 69, p 224.
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[S]ubmarines may transit submerged and military aircraft may overfly
in combat formation and with normal equipment operation; surface warships
may transit in a manner necessary for their security, including formation
steaming and the launching and recovery of aircraft, where consistent
with sound navigational practices. s3

The concluding clause of this statement should not be overlooked.
The right to engage in activities incident to the normal mode of continuous
and expeditious transit may be lawfully exercised only to the extent
that geography permits" and to the extent consistent with the obligation of aircraft to have due regard for the safety of navigation8
and the obligation of ships to comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for safety at sea.86Aircraft
must remain over water in the areas in which they enjoy a right of
overflight under the Law of the Sea Convention, be it over the waters
of the strait, including its approaches, in the case of transit passage,
or in the air routes above designated sea lanes in the case of archipelagic
sea lanes passage (or, in their absence with respect to the relevant
route through archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea, the
routes normally used for international navigation).
Lawyers who analyze (and occasionally fret about) these matters
in the abstract should consider the very real practical limitations on
the exercise of rights." In practice, geographic and safety constraints
constitute significant limitations on the options available in straits.
83 US Commentary, supra note 75, p1 9 (transit passage) and p22 (archipelagic
sea lanes passage).
84 In classes dealing with this subject, my students are fond of circulating the
following reported US Navy transcript of a radio conversation off the coast of
Newfoundland in October 1995:
AMERICANS: Please divert your course 15 degrees to the north to avoid
a collision.
CANADIANS: Recommend you divert your course 15 degrees to the south
to avoid collision.
AMERICANS: This is the captain of a US Navy ship. I say again, divert your
course.
CANADIANS: No. I say again, you divert your course.
AMERICANS: This is the aircraft carrier USS Lincoln, the second largest
ship in the United States Atlantic fleet. We are accompanied
by three destroyers, three cruisers and numerous support
vessels. I demand that you change your course 15 degrees
north. That's one five degrees north, or counter measures
will be undertaken to ensure the safety of this ship.
CANADIANS: This is a lighthouse. Your call.
85 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 39(3)(a).
86 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 39(2)(a).
87 They would do well to recall one of the classic understatements in naval history,
'A collision at sea can ruin your entire day'.
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Straits are, after all, relatively narrow and there may be considerable
shipping traffic both through and across the strait limiting the choices
available to ships. In some busy straits, sea lanes and traffic separation
schemes have been established for ships. Where there is a major city
on the straits, there is likely to be a major airport in the vicinity; this
requires particular care for the safety of aircraft using that airport.
In a congested or narrow strait, it is particularly unlikely that we will
see launching or recovery of fixed wing aircraft, be it as a matter of
law or prudence.
Where archipelagic sea lanes run through congested or narrow
straits between islands, the same practical limitations are likely to
be present. It is in broad open areas, such as those where archipelagic
sea lanes approach their maximum width of 50 miles, that activities
such as launching and recovering fixed wing aircraft are most likely
to be consistent with geographic and safety considerations, and most
likely to be needed. It is reasonable to assume that it is largely- although
clearly not exclusively with such areas in mind that such options are
being kept open.
There is no provision for air routes above sea lanes in straits
comparable to those over archipelagic sea lanes. The reason is that
archipelagic waters may contain expanses of open water in which it
was considered reasonable to limit the right of archipelagic sea lanes
passage to a liberal, but nevertheless prescribed, horizontal area. In
straits, sea lanes and traffic separation schemes are designated only
for the classic purpose of ensuring safety of navigation by ships, It
should nevertheless be borne in mind that the duty to remain over
the waters of the strait in which there is a right of transit passage,
the duty of due regard for the safety of navigation, and the duty normally
to comply with the ICAO Rules of the Air are likely to result in adherence
to horizontal and vertical self-restraint in practice.
88

Straits states do have an option where geography and traffic patterns permit.
They can restrict the breadth of the territorial sea in the strait so that 'there
exists through the strait a route through the high seas or through an exclusive
economic zone of similar convenience with respect to navigational and
hydrographical characteristics.' In that case, the regime of straits would not
apply; there would be freedom of navigation and overflight beyond the territorial
sea, but only a right of innocent passage for ships within the territorial sea.
Law of the Sea Convention, supranote 13, art 36. Attempting to use this approach
as a means for escaping the need for approval of sea lanes by the competent
international organization would, however, be of questionable validity. See ibid,
arts 39(2)(a), 41(4), 44, 300. It is also questionable, in light of the provision for
such sea lanes, whether in most instances it would be in the interests of the
straits state itself to restrict its territorial sea because of largely hypothetical
concerns regarding overflight of straits.
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VII. ASSISTANCE

'Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief.' 9
Article 18(2) of the Law of the Sea Convention, in the context of its
'continuous and expeditious' requirement for passage, expressly permits
stopping and anchoring 'for the purpose of rendering assistance to
persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress.'90 While article 18(2)
applies only to innocent passage, it is logical to regard such assistance
as 'incident to' the 'normal model[] of continuous and expeditious'
transit in the context of the regimes of transit passage and archipelagic
sea lanes passage.9 Any other conclusion would be in tension with
the traditions of protecting both mariners and aviators and, in context,
would lead to the absurd result that rescue is expressly authorized
in areas where a more restrictive innocent passage regime applies,
namely the territorial sea outside most straits and archipelagic waters
outside archipelagic sea lanes, but is not permitted (in textual terms,
is not regarded as a normal incident of transit) in areas where a more
2
liberal transit regime applies, namely straits and archipelagic sea lanes.1
Although the innocent passage provisions do not include a right
to overfly the territorial sea, article 18(2) may be plausibly interpreted
to permit the use by a ship of all available persons, craft and equipment
carried on board, including aircraft, necessary for the purpose of
rendering assistance. Be that as it may, the provisions regarding transit
passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage do include a right to overfly
and therefore would logically be interpreted to include the rendering
of assistance by ships or aircraft.

89
90
91
92

Wagnerv InternationalRailway, 232 NY 176,133 NE 437 (1921) (New York Court
of Appeals, Cardozo, J).
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 18(2).
The rule is best regarded not as a grant of a new right, but as a specific application
of the ancient duty to rescue at sea. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note
13, art 98.
Caminos reaches the same conclusion, but would apparently base it on the force
majeure or distress exception in art 38(1)(c). Caminos, supra note 31, p 148.
That is certainly a plausible reading. My preference for regarding the rendering
of assistance as 'incident to' the 'normal model[] of continuous and expeditious'
transit is influenced in part by the general belief that rescue is properly regarded
as incident to navigation at sea, and in part by the structure of art 18(2). That
article not only establishes in the context of innocent passage that the rendering
of assistance does not contravene the requirement that passage be continuous
and expeditious, but adds the reference to such assistance after its reference
to force majeure or distress, possibly implying a distinction between the two.
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In addition, the United States Government has concluded that there
is a right of assistance entry into foreign territorial seas (and archipelagic waters) independent of the rights of innocent passage, transit
passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage. Commanders of naval
vessels are authorized to exercise this right where the location of the
danger or distress is reasonably well known, but not to conduct searches.
The operational commander of military aircraft is authorized to do
so, without further guidance from higher authority in consultation with
the Department of State, only if any delay in rendering assistance could
be life-threatening. Accordingly to this policy, 'While the permission
of the coastal State is not required, notification of the entry should
be given to the coastal State both as a matter of comity and for the
purpose of alerting the rescue forces of that State.' 3
VIII. RIGHTS OF STRAITS STATES AND ARCHIPELAGIC STATES

Straits states and archipelagic states have the right to expect that ships
and aircraft remain within the confines of the transit rights accorded
them by the Law of the Sea Convention and respect the duties imposed
by the Convention in connection with the exercise of those rights.
They may enforce that right by diplomatic means or before a competent
international tribunal. The question is one of other remedies.
Yturriaga addresses the question in the following way:
What would happen if passing aircraft do not proceed without delay over

the strait or during its transit use force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of the State bordering the strait, in
violation of the principles of the UN Charter? Can the coastal State prevent
such a passage? ... [A]ircraft engaged in such type of unlawful activities
... are not exercising the right of transit passage and any activity which
is not an exercise of the right of transit passage through a strait remains
subject to other application provisions of the Convention. If the transit
of an aircraft does not fall under the conditions of transit passage pursuant
to article 38 or the aircraft indulges in activities expressly forbidden by
article 39, the aircraft will not enjoy the right of transit passage and the
unlawful activities will be subject to other applicable provisions of the
Convention. The coastal State may resort, by analogy, to article 25(1)
94
in order to justify interfering with aircraft's non-transit passage.
93

Statement of Policy by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and
the United States Coast Guard Concerning Exercise of the Right of Assistance
Entry (1986), reproduced in AR Thomas & James C Duncan, eds, Annotated
Supplement to the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 163
(analysis at pp 120-121 and note 35) (Newport, Rhode Island, USA: US Naval
War College, 1999).
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Yturriaga, supra note 69, p 222.
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As to the use of force against the coastal state, as previously indicated,
the matter is dealt with by the UN Charter and the inherent right of
self-defense recognized by the Charter." It should be clear, however,
that transit of warships or military aircraft, alone or in squadrons or
task forces, does not, in itself, give rise to any such right.
In the event that the vessel or aircraft were outside the area in
which it enjoys a right of transit, the matter would be addressed in
the same way as would be appropriate in any other part of the territory,
territorial sea or archipelagic waters of a state, bearing in mind the
immunities of warships and military aircraft. The absence of ambiguity
is an important predicate for action in this connection. A relatively
easy case is presented by an aircraft over land.
If it were objectively evident from its conduct that a vessel or aircraft
was not present for the purpose of transit, again the matter would
be addressed in the same way as would be appropriate in any other
part of the territorial sea or archipelagic waters. The absence of ambiguity
is an important predicate for action in this connection as well, again
bearing in mind the immunities of warships and military aircraft. A
relatively easy case is presented by dropping anti-government leaflets
96
from an aircraft.
The underlying question concerns the consequences of non-compliance (or doubts regarding compliance) with the conditions for transit.
The right of transit passage must not be 'impeded' and the right of
archipelagic sea lanes passage must be 'unobstructed'.97 Neither may
be hampered or suspended.9 8 It is true that article 25(1) permits the
coastal state to 'take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent
passage which is not innocent'. 99 But that article applies only to innocent
passage. There is no comparable provision in the articles dealing with
transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage. This was deliberate.
Caminos observes:

95

Hailbronner's invocation of 'preventive' self-defense is risky. It might be borne
in mind that anticipatory self-defense is a double-edged sword, and that military
and naval commanders are undoubtedly under standing orders to protect their
units from attack. See Kay Hailbronner, 'Freedom of the Air and the Convention
on the Law of the Sea', (1983) 77AJIL 490,520 (hereinafter cited as Hailbronner).
96 Because such reactions have in fact occurred, it bears mentioning in this
connection, quite apart from the rules contained in the new art 3 bis it is difficult
to justify the use of deadly force in response to navigational error or distributing
leaflets as necessary, proportional, or otherwise appropriate.
97 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 38(1), 53(3).
98 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 44, 54.
99 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 25(1).
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The right of transit passage defined in Article 38 ... is separate and distinct
form the duties listed in Article 39. ... A breach of a duty under Article
39 simply creates international responsibility in the flag State without
granting strait States the unilateral right to determine violations, or to
deny the right of transit passage based on such determinations. ... This
approach is completely different from that followed in Article 25 .... which
expressly grants the coastal State the right to prevent passage which
is not innocent. ... [A] violation of the provisions of one article [39] does
not correspond to the loss of a right under another article [38.100

Hailbronner reaches the same conclusion, adding, "The Convention
neither grants coastal states the power to define 'the normal modes
of continuous and expeditious transit' nor allows any interference with
10
transiting aircraft." '
In addressing an issue of this sort, it is particularly important to
bear in mind the rule of good faith set forth in article 300 of the Law
of the Sea Convention and in article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. Thus, for example, in textual terms, the question
can be posed simplistically as one concerning the effect of the words
'in accordance with this Part' in the clause defining transit passage
as 'the exercise in accordance with this Part of the freedom of navigation
and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious
transit of the strait' and in the equivalent definition of archipelagic
sea lanes passage.' 2 From this, one presumes that even a first-year
law student could construct the syllogism that any vessel or aircraft
that does not comply with any obligation no longer comes within the
definition of the transit right, and the coastal state is free to deal with
its unauthorized presence in the same way as with any other unauthorized presence in its waters. A similar game could be played in
reverse with the sovereignty of the coastal states, which 'is exercised
subject to this Convention' or parts thereof.0 3
This is not a reasonable interpretation of the transit passage and
archipelagic sea lanes passage regimes in context. Unilateral enforcement by the coastal state of the conditions for transit or its own
interpretation thereof was simply not contemplated or authorized
except where expressly permitted. This is particularly evident when
we turn to the question of regulation and enforcement of regulations.

100
101
102
103

Caminos, supra note 31, pp 149-50.
Hailbronner, supra note 95, (1983) 77 AJL p 490, 520.
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 38(2), 53(3).
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 2(3), 34(2), 49(3). Indeed, the
same student could have a field day with the effects on coastal states and other
states of comparable cross-references to limitations and obligations elsewhere
in the Convention.
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While the coastal state enjoys significant unilateral powers to regulate
innocent passage,10 4 that is not the case with respect to transit passage
or archipelagic sea lanes passage. In the case of 'safety of navigation
and the regulation of maritime traffic', its regulatory powers are limited
to what is 'provided in article 41', namely establishing sea lanes and
traffic separation schemes to promote the safe passage of ships, which
must be adopted by the competent international organization.0 5 (The
same system applies to the designation of archipelagic sea lanes and
the air routes thereabove). 0° Pollution control regulations are limited
to those 'giving effect to applicable international regulations regarding
the discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the
1 07

strait.'

The exercise of enforcement powers by the coastal states is limited
to foreign ships not entitled to sovereign immunity which have committed violations of such safety or pollution regulations 'causing or
threatening major damage to the marine environment of the straits."' 8
While the regime of innocent passage contemplates the right to expel
warships that violate relevant regulations,100 there is no such provision
in the case of transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage. Instead,
in the very article dealing with straits state laws and regulations,
express provision is made for the international responsibility of the
flag state of a ship or the state of registry of an aircraft entitled to
sovereign immunity for violation of provisions of the Convention or
such laws and regulations that result in loss or damage to the coastal
state."' While Spain and others did not succeed in imposing strict
liability in this context, article 304 specifies that the Convention's
provisions on responsibility and liability 'are without prejudice to the
application of existing rules and the development of further rules
regarding responsibility and liability under international law."
In sum, Yturriaga is correct when he concludes regarding the Law
of the Sea Convention, 'States bordering straits are not empowered
to adopt laws and regulations in respect of air navigation, or to designate
air corridors and prescribe air separation schemes. '1 2 He must ac-

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 21-22, 211(4),
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 42(1)(a).
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 53.
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 42(1)(b), 54.
Law of the Sea Convention, supranote 13, art 233. This also should be regarded
as applicable to archipelagic sea lanes passage. See supra note 56.
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 30.
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts 42(5), 54.
See Yturriaga, supra note 69, pp 143, 234.
Yturriaga, supra note 69, p 222.
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cordingly look elsewhere for the legal basis for the Spanish declaration
upon signature of the Convention in 1989 (maintained upon ratification), which provides as follows:
It is the Spanish Government's interpretation that the regime established
in Part III of the Convention is compatible with the right of the coastal
State to issue and apply its own air regulations in the air space of the
straits used for international navigation so long as this does not impede
the transit passage of aircraft.

He looks to the Chicago Convention, and to the application of its
provisions regarding territorial waters to straits with respect to transit
passage by aircraft. As previously discussed, it is not appropriate to
interpret the reference to 'territorial waters' in the Chicago Convention
in this way. The substance of Spain's declaration 'seems incompatible
with Article 39(3)(a) of the 1982 Convention, which requires, in part,
that civil aircraft in transit passage 'observe the Rules of the Air
established by the International Civil Aviation Organization.' 13
As stated in the ICAO Secretariat Study:
[T]he States bordering a strait cannot file a difference to Annex 2 - Rules
of the Air - under Article 38 of the Chicago Convention with respect to
the airspace over the straits. ... The UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea de facto, without any need for an amendment of the Chicago Convention, would lead to an extension of the ultimate legislative jurisdiction
of the ICAO Council [under Article 12 of the Chicago Convention] with
respect to the Rules of the Air also over the airspace above straits used
for international navigation.114
[I]n no circumstances can the States bordering such straits suspend or
limit the right of transit passage, nor can they require the application
5
of their own rules of the air.'"
113 Caminos, supra note 31, p 229.
114 ICAO Secretariat Study, supra note 46, para 9.7. 'Our Rapporteur agrees with
para 9.7 of the Secretariat's study that the reference is to Annex 2 as adopted
and amended by the ICAO Council, without taking account of differences filed
by contracting States under Art 38 of the Chicago Convention.' ICAO Rapporteur,
supra note 60, para 15.
115 ICAO Secretariat Study, supra note 46, paras 9.7, 9.13.
The right of transit passage has certain consequences for foreign civil aircraft:
(a) In the case of non-scheduled flight, ... the coastal State will be unable
to require landing, to prescribe routes or to insist on special permission,
as it otherwise could do under Art 5 [of the Chicago Convention];
(b) Similarly, in the case of scheduled air services such aircraft will be able
to exercise the right of transit without the special permission or
authorisation required by Art 6 of the Chicago Convention. In such cases
it will be irrelevant whether the coastal State has given permission under
an air services agreement or under the International Air Services Transit
Agreement or otherwise.
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MONITORING RADIO FREQUENCIES AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

Article 39(3)(b) of the Law of the Sea Convention provides that aircraft
in transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage'1 6shall 'at all times
monitor the radio frequency assigned by the competent internationally
designated air traffic control authority or the appropriate international
distress radio frequency." The history of this provision relates to
military overflight of straits and archipelagic waters. The provisions
in article 39(1)(a) that state aircraft 'will normally comply with' the
Rules of the Air and 'will at all times operate with due regard for the
safety of navigation' do not expressly address the issue of radio monitoring
and communications in those situations in which military aircraft are
unable to comply with the Rules of the Air. Some states proposed
a requirement of two-way communication with air traffic controllers.
These proposals were not accepted because of concerns regarding
the security of military aircraft or their mission in certain situations.
What emerged was an accommodation that requires state aircraft
to listen at all times, but not necessarily to speak. Insofar as state
aircraft are concerned, this provision does not conflict with the Chicago
Convention, as that Convention does not apply to overflight by state
aircraft.

Because Art 44 of UNCLOS provides that the right of transit passage
cannot be suspended, it cannot be affected by ... provisions [of other
conventions or agreements] for suspension, such as Art 89 of the Chicago
Convention ('War and emergency conditions'), Art 1.1 of IASTA, and
similar provisions of air services agreements.
(d) The right of the coastal State under Art 9 of the Chicago Convention to
create restricted or prohibited areas over its territory (including its
territorial sea) for reasons of military necessity or public safety will not
be exercisable so as to restrict or prohibit transit passage ..., nor will
the right temporarily to restrict or prohibit flying over the whole or part
of its territory in exceptional circumstances or during an emergency or
in the interest of public safety.
ICAO Rapporteur, supra note 60, para 13. The result for overflight by state
aircraft, to which the Chicago Convention does not apply and which are not
bound to respect the Rules of the Air under the Law of the Sea Convention in
all cases, is a fortiori no less restrictive.
116 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art 54.
117 The expression 'internationally designated air traffic control authority' could,
in the context of the Chicago Convention, mean only that the authority is listed
in the appropriate Regional Air Navigation Plan approved by the Council of ICAO.
The 'appropriate international distress radio frequency'... is the VHF emergency
frequency 121.5MHz referred to in Annex 10-Aeronautical Telecommunications
to the Chicago Convention as well as in other Annexes.
ICAO Secretariat Study, supra note 46, para 9.11; Milde, supra note 46, 187.
(c)
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Notwithstanding its history, as drafted the radio monitoring provision applies to all aircraft, not just to state aircraft. For this reason,
a question has arisen regarding the compatibility of this provision with
regulations under the Chicago Convention applicable to civil aircraft.11 8
The 1984 ICAO Secretariat Study states in this regard:
With respect to the duty to monitor the ATC frequency and the appropriate
international distress radio frequency, the UN Convention formulates this
duty as an alternative. ... It is submitted that the UN Convention in this
respect contains an error ...
which has not been corrected in spite of
ICAO notification to the UN Secretariat and to the Drafting Committee
of the Conference. In fact, ... both these frequencies have to be monitored
at all times [citing Standard 3.6.5.1 in Annex 2 - Rules of the Air and
Standard 5.2.2.1.1.1 in Annex 10 - Aeronautical Telecommunications, Vol
II] ... the word 'or' in the Convention should have read 'and'; in view
of the delicate overall compromise on the issues of straits, the Conference
was apparently reluctant to make any, however minor, textual changes
in this respect. In practice this matter will be of minor importance and
does not represent a real conflict; the ICAO Standards are lex specialis
which in practical application will be complied with in spite of the general
broad terms of the Convention which, in any case, are not excluding or
prohibiting the compliance with more stringent standards." 9
Nandan and Anderson, who are well informed about the negotiation
and drafting of the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention regarding
straits and archipelagoes, comment as follows:
It may well be true that those standards [cited in the ICAO Secretariat
Study] will always be complied with in practice; however, Article 39(3)
is also a lex specialis for the overflight of straits by aircraft of all types
and it should not be thought to contain errors. 20
In this connection, the ICAO Secretariat Study also states:
Since the duty to maintain continuous listening watch of the ATC frequency
applies, under Annex 2, only to controlled flights, it must be concluded
that in view of Article 39, paragraph 3 of the UN Convention no uncontrolled
flights are contemplated for transit passage over straits used for international navigation.' 2'
118 That question in turn poses at least a theoretical issue regarding state aircraft
under the Law of the Sea Convention because it provides that they 'will normally
comply with' the Rules of the Air.
119 ICAO Secretariat Study, supra note 46, para 9.12.
120 Nandan &Anderson, supra note 62, (1989) BYBIL 186. In this connection, an ICAO
Report draws attention "to the comments of the Netherlands, which do not agree
with the Secretariat's belief that UNCLOS is in error, or that 'it is a firmly
established practice that the aircraft must monitor the international emergency
frequency'." ICAO Rapporteur, supra note 60, para 19.
121 ICAO Secretariat Study, supra note 46, para 9.10.
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This conclusion is open to doubt, in part because article 39(3)(b)
provides an alternative.122 Be that as it may, the reasoning presumably
applies only to civil aircraft. In this connection it should be borne
in mind that Standard 3.6.5.1 of Annex 2 - Rules of the Air requires
that 'an aircraft operated as a controlled flight shall maintain continuous listening watch on the appropriate radio frequency of, and establish
two-way communication as necessary with, the appropriate air traffic
control unit ...' Both the text and the history of the Law of the Sea

Convention make clear that an obligation to operate only as a controlled
flight and to maintain two-way communication 'as necessary' with an
air traffic control unit was not imposed on state aircraft. In the particular
context of straits and archipelagic sea lanes, it might be considered
more broadly whether it is prudent to take an approach that might
encourage state aircraft to exercise their option not to comply with
ICAO Rules.
X. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
The application of the compulsory dispute settlement provisions of
the Law of the Sea Convention to overflight by military aircraft requires
consideration of several provisions. In principle, pursuant to article
286, all disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the
Convention are subject to compulsory arbitration or adjudication.
Moreover, disputes regarding the exercise by a coastal state of its
sovereign rights or jurisdiction are not excluded by article 297 from
compulsory arbitration or adjudication where they concern freedoms
and rights of navigation or overflight, or law enforcement activities
in relation thereto.
However, article 298(1)(b) allows a state to make a declaration
excluding 'disputes concerning military activities, including military
activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and disputes concerning law enforcement activities in
regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from
the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under article 297, paragraph 2
[coastal state rights regarding marine scientific research] or 3 [coastal
state rights regarding living resources in the exclusive economic zone]'.
In addition, article 298(1)(c) permits a declaration excluding disputes
before the UN Security Council. A fair number of parties have made
such declarations, but many have not.
It is possible therefore that an arbitral or judicial tribunal would
have compulsory jurisdiction under the Law of the Sea Convention
122 See George W Ash, '1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea - Its Impact on Air
Law', [1987] Air Force L Rev 35, 47.
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over a dispute concerning overflight by civil aircraft or, where the
states concerned have not filed declarations excluding such a dispute,
by military aircraft. However, under articles 281 and 282, the dispute
settlement provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention are subordinated to any agreement between the parties to settle the dispute
by other means, and in particular under article 282 to any agreement
between the parties according compulsory jurisdiction to a forum
empowered to render a binding decision. This raises two questions
regarding the dispute settlement provisions of the Chicago Convention:
1)
2)

Do they apply to overflight by military aircraft?
Where there are substantial legal and factual issues in common
under both Conventions, to what extent, if any, would a
dispute relating to the interpretation or application of the
Chicago Convention and subject to its dispute settlement
procedures be regarded as the same as a dispute concerning
the interpretation or application of the Law of the Sea
Convention for purposes of articles 281 and 282?

As to the first question, paragraph (a) of article 3 provides that
the Chicago Convention shall not be applicable to state aircraft. Paragraphs
(c) and (d) of that article, however, contain specific rules regarding
state aircraft. The obvious interpretation is that the word 'Convention'
in article 3(a) means all the other operative articles of the Convention,
including the dispute settlement provisions. There are doubtless others.
The question of actions taken against civil aircraft (by military aircraft
or otherwise) is yet another matter.
Although the incorporation by reference of the Rules of the Air into
the transit passage regime of the Law of the Sea Convention is unusually
explicit, the second question also arises in the context of the many
direct and indirect references to international standards, rules, regulations and procedures contained in IMO conventions regarding matters
such as navigation safety and prevention of pollution. IMO conventions
also contain dispute settlement provisions. It is unclear what conclusions would be reached where, for example, an action is brought under
the Law of the Sea Convention, the question is whether an aircraft
in transit passage complied with the Rules of the Air and, if not, the
legal consequences of the violation, and the respondent objects to
jurisdiction on the grounds that both states, as parties to the Chicago
Convention, have agreed on an alternative forum for adjudication of
23
the dispute.

123 See Bernard H Oxman, 'ComplementaryAgreements and Compulsory Jurisdiction,'
(2001) 95 AJIL 277, 301.
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XI. CONCLUSION

The right of all aircraft, including military aircraft, to exercise the right
of transit passage over straits and archipelagic sea lanes passage is
clearly established by the Law of the Sea Convention. Viewed in historical
context, neither right is new. Rather, it preserves, with important
limitations, the freedom of navigation and overflight over the high seas
that obtained in most of the affected waters with a classic three-mile
territorial sea measured from classic baselines. It is not an intrusion
into the sovereignty of the coastal state over its internal waters,
archipelagic waters, or territorial sea, but rather a condition intended
to protect and preserve the global communications rights of all states,
especially in view of the extensions of that sovereignty that are recognized
by the Convention.
The fear of a greater risk of armed attack in this context is unjustified.
The right accorded is carefully confined to the need: transit. The
prohibition on the use or threat of force, the right of self-defense and
the powers of the UN Security Council as provided in the UN Charter
and international law apply at sea and on land.124 The speed, range
and armaments of modern military aircraft are such that slight differences in their proximity to the coast may not be significant from
a defense point of view. The right of individual self-defense of the coastal
state is unaffected. Its right of collective self-defense is, in many
circumstances, itself dependent upon the mobility of forces that might
come to its aid. Similarly, while the UN Security Council may have
the legal power to require states to permit forces carrying out its
decisions to transit their territory, 2 5 in practice the ability of the
Security Council to carry out its collective security functions is itself
dependent upon and enhanced by the mobility of warships and military
aircraft under the Law of the Sea Convention.
The transiting forces of a state (like its other facilities and nationals
abroad) are of course subject to attack by a third state or terrorists.
However, the fact that ships and aircraft in transit are permitted (indeed
expected) to take normal defensive precautions, that such an attack
would also constitute a violation of the sovereignty of the coastal state,
and that such an attack might well impair the transit rights of other
states reduces the risk of such an eventuality.

124 A state intent on using force in the territory of another state either believes
it has the right to do so or is prepared to ignore its fundamental obligations
under the UN Charter; in either case the sovereignty of the latter state over
waters off its coast is unlikely to be regarded as an impediment.
125 See UN Charter, arts 25, 39, 41, 42, 48, 49.
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The fear of involvement in disputes that do not concern the coastal
state is misplaced. If anything, the rights of transit recognized by the
Law of the Sea Convention permit the coastal state to distance itself
from the ultimate mission of the forces in transit. It is irrelevant. Because
the coastal state has no right to interfere with transit, it can more
easily resist both foreign and domestic pressures to do so, and avoid
or more easily deflect both foreign and domestic complaints.'26
Safety is of course in the interests of all. The fact that state aircraft
are only 'normally' obliged to respect the safety measures in the Rules
of the Air is a response to specific problems, not an invitation to ignore
safety: state aircraft must 'at all times' operate with due regard for
the safety of navigation. Given the elaborate system for command and
control of military aircraft, it is to be expected that the requirement
'normally' to respect the safety measures in the Rules of the Air will
be reflected in the general guidance and enforced in the specific operational
orders under which those aircraft operate.
The law of the sea and the law of the air, to a significant degree,
developed separately from each other. Each has its own specialists.
Each is now based on a very widely ratified convention. There are
doubtless many details of harmonization, especially with respect to
civil aircraft, that remain to be thought through and given regulatory
form by ICAO and others.
Coordinating the interaction between different fields of law is one
of the more interesting things that lawyers do. It may be hoped that
this study in some measure facilitates the process, or at least enlivens
it.

126 For example, the fact that flight plans and two-way radio communication are
not required in all cases presumably made it easier for the Spanish Government
some years ago to distance itself from the overflight by US military aircraft of
the Strait of Gibraltar en route to a mission over Libya.
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APPENDIX
Selected Provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea
Preamble
The States Parties to this Convention,
Conscious that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need
to be considered as a whole,
Recognizing the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due
regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans
which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful
uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their
resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection
and preservation of the marine environment,
Believing that the codification and progressive development of the law of the
sea achieved in this Convention will contribute to the strengthening of peace,
security, co-operation and friendly relations among all nations in conformity
with the principles of justice and equal rights and will promote the economic
and social advancement of all peoples of the world, in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations as set forth in the Charter,
Affirming that matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed
by the rules and principles of general international law,
Have agreed as follows:

Part 11
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
Article 2
1.

2.
3.

The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and
internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic
waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.
This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well
as to its bed and subsoil.
The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention
and to other rules of international law.
Article 3

Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to
a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined
in accordance with this Convention.
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Article 4
The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a
distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the
territorial sea.
Article 8
1.
2.

Except as provided in Part IV, waters on the landward side of the baseline
of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State.
Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the
method set forth in article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters
areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent
passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters.
Article 17

Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked,
enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.
Article 18
2.

Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes
stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to
ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeureor distress
or for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft
in danger or distress.
Part III
Straits used for International Navigation
Article 34

1.

The regime of passage through straits used for international navigation
established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the legal status
of the waters forming such straits or the exercise by the States bordering
the straits of their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters and their
air space, bed and subsoil.

2.

The sovereignty or jurisdiction of the States bordering the straits is exercised
subject to this Part and to other rules of international law.
Article 35

Nothing in this Part affects:
(a) any areas of internal waters within a strait, except where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set
forth in article 7 has the effect of enclosing an internal waters areas
which had not previously been considered as such;
(b) the legal status of the waters beyond the territorial seas of
States bordering straits as exclusive economic zones or high seas;
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(c) the legal regime in straits in which passage is regulated in whole or
in part by long-standing international conventions in force specifically
relating to such straits.
Article 36
This Part does not apply to a strait used for international navigation if there
exists through the strait a route through the high seas or through an exclusive
economic zone of similar convenience with respect to navigational and
hydrographical characteristics; in such routes, the other relevant Parts of this
Convention, including the provisions regarding the freedom of navigation and
overflight, apply.
Section 2. Transit Passage
Article 37
This section applies to straits which are used for international navigation
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.
Article 38
1.

2.

3.

In straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right
of transit passage, which shall not be impeded; except that, if the strait
is formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland,
transit passage shall not apply if there exists seaward of the island a route
through the high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of similar
convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics.
Transit passage means the exercise in accordance with this Part of the
freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous
and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas
or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an
exclusive economic zone. However, the requirement of continuous and
expeditious transit does not preclude passage through the strait for the
purpose of entering, leaving or returning from a State bordering the strait,
subject to the conditions of entry to that State.
Any activity which is not an exercise of the right of transit passage through
a strait remains subject to the other applicable provisions of this Convention.
Article 39

1.

Ships and aircraft, while exercising the right of transit passage, shall:
(a) proceed without delay through or over the strait;
(b) refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of States bordering
the strait, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
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(c)

2.

3.

refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal
modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress;
(d) comply with other relevant provisions of this Part.
Ships in transit passage shall:
(a) comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for safety at sea, including the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea;
(b) comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for the prevention, reduction and control of
pollution from ships.
Aircraft in transit passage shall:
(a) observe the Rules of the Air established by the International Civil
Aviation Organization as they apply to civil aircraft; state aircraft
will normally comply with such safety measures and will at all times
operate with due regard for the safety of navigation;
(b) at all times monitor the radio frequency assigned by the competent
internationally designated air traffic control authority or the appropriate international distress radio frequency.
Article 40

During transit passage, foreign ships, including marine scientific research and
hydrographic survey ships, may not carry out any research or survey activities
without the prior authorization of the States bordering straits.
Article 41
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

In conformity with this Part, States bordering straits may designate sea
lanes and prescribe traffic separation schemes for navigation in straits
where necessary to promote the safe passage of ships.
Such States may, when circumstances require, and after giving due publicity
thereto, substitute other sea lanes or traffic separation schemes for any
sea lanes or traffic separation schemes previously designated or prescribed
by them.
Such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes shall conform to generally
accepted international regulations.
Before designating or substituting sea lanes or prescribing or substituting
traffic separation schemes, States bordering straits shall refer proposals
to the competent international organization with a view to their adoption.
The organization may adopt only such sea lanes and traffic separation
schemes as may be agreed with the States bordering the straits, after which
the States may designate, prescribe or substitute them.
In respect of a strait where sea lanes or traffic separation schemes through
the waters of two or more States bordering the strait are being proposed,
the States concerned shall co-operate in formulating proposals in consultation with the competent international organization.
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States bordering straits shall clearly indicate all sea lanes and traffic
schemes designated or prescribed by them on charts to which due publicly
shall be given.
Ships in transit passage shall respect applicable sea lanes and traffic
separation schemes established in accordance with this article.
Article 42

1.

2.

3.
4.
5.

Subject to the provisions of this section, States bordering straits may adopt
laws and regulations relating to transit passage through straits, in respect
of all or any of the following:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic, as
provided in article 41;
(b) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution, by giving effect
to applicable international regulations regarding the discharge of
oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the strait;
(c) with respect to fishing vessels, the prevention of fishing, including
the stowage of fishing gear;
(d) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person
in contravention of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws
and regulations of States bordering straits.
Such laws and regulation shall not discriminate in form or in fact among
foreign ships or in their application have the practical effect of denying,
hampering or impairing the right of transit passage as defined in this
section.
States bordering straits shall give due publicity to all such laws and
regulations.
Foreign ships exercising the right of transit passage shall comply with
such laws and regulations.
The flag State of a ship or the State of registry of an aircraft entitled to
sovereign immunity which acts in a manner contrary to such laws and
regulations or other provisions of this Part shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage which results to States bordering straits.
Article 43

User States and States bordering a strait should by agreement co-operate:
(a) in the establishment and maintenance in a strait of necessary navigational and safety aids or other improvements in aid of international
navigation; and
(b) for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships.
Article 44
States bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage and shall give appropriate
publicity to any danger to navigation or overflight within or over the strait
of which they have knowledge. There shall be no suspension of transit passage.
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Section 3. Innocent Passage
Article 45
1.

2.

The regime of innocent passage, in accordance with Part II, section 3, shall
apply in straits used for international navigation:
(a) excluded from the application of the regime of transit passage under
article 38, paragraph 1; or
(b) between a part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone
and the territorial sea of a foreign State.
There shall be no suspension of innocent passage through such straits.

Part IV
Archipelagic States
Article 46
For the purposes of this Convention:
(a) 'archipelagic State' means a State constituted wholly by one or more
archipelagos and may include other islands;
(b) 'archipelago' means a group of islands, including parts of islands,
interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely
interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form
an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which
historically have been regarded as such.
Article 47
1.

2.

3.
5.

6.

An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the
outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands
and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of
the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.
The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except
that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any
archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical
miles.
The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general configuration of the archipelago.
The system of such baselines shall not be applied by an archipelagic State
in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas or the exclusive economic
zone the territorial sea of another State.
If a part of the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State lies between
two parts of an immediately adjacent neighbouring State, existing rights
and all other legitimate interests which the latter State has traditionally
exercised in such waters and all rights stipulated by agreement between
those States shall continue and be respected.
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Article 48
The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic
zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines
drawn in accordance with article 47.
Article 49
1.

2.
3.
4.

The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed
by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from
the coast.
This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters,
as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
This sovereignty is exercised subject to this Part.
The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall
not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including
the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty
over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources
contained therein.
Article 50

Within its archipelagic waters, the archipelagic State may draw closing lines
for the delimitation of internal waters, in accordance with articles 9, 10 and
11.
Article 52
1.

2.

Subject to article 53 and without prejudice to article 50, ships of all States
enjoy the right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters, in accordance with Part II, section 3.
The archipelagic State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among
foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic
waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential
for the protection of its security. Such suspension shall take effect only
after having been duly published.
Article 53

1.

2.
3.

An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes thereabove,
suitable for the continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and
aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial
sea.
All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage
in such sea lanes and air routes.
Archipelagic sea lanes passage means the exercise in accordance with
this Convention of the rights of navigation and overflight in the normal
mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious, and unobstructed
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transit between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone
and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.
4. Such sea lanes and air routes shall traverse the archipelagic waters and
the adjacent territorial sea and shall include all normal passage routes
used as routes for international navigation or overflight through or over
archipelagic waters and, within such routes, so far as ships are concerned,
all normal navigational channels, provided that duplication of routes of
similar convenience between the same entry and exit points shall not be
necessary.
5. Such sea lanes and air routes shall be defined by a series of continuous
axis lines from the entry points of passage routes to the exit points. Ships
and aircraft in archipelagic sea lanes passage shall not deviate more than
25 nautical miles to either side of such axis lines during passage, provided
that such ships and aircraft shall not navigate closer to the coasts than
10 per cent of the distance between the nearest points on islands bordering
the sea lane.
6. An archipelagic State which designates sea lanes under this article may
also prescribe traffic separation schemes for the safe passage of ships
through narrow channels in such sea lanes.
8. Such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes shall conform to generally
accepted international regulations.
9. In designating or substituting sea lanes or prescribing or substituting traffic
separation schemes, an archipelagic State shall refer proposals to the
competent international organization with a view to their adoption. The
organization may adopt only such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes
as may be agreed with the archipelagic State, after which the archipelagic
State may designate, prescribe or substitute them.
10. The archipelagic State shall clearly indicate the axis of the sea lanes and
the traffic separation schemes designated or prescribed by it on charts
to which due publicity shall be given.
11. Ships in archipelagic sea lanes passage shall respect applicable sea lanes
and traffic separation schemes established in accordance with this article.
12. If an archipelagic State does not designate sea lanes or air routes, the
right of archipelagic sea lanes passage may be exercised through the routes
normally used for international navigation.
Article 54
Articles 39, 40, 42 and 44 apply mutatis mutandis to archipelagic sea lanes
passage.
Part V
Exclusive Economic Zone
Article 55
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial
sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which
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the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms
of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.
Article 56
1.

2.

3.

In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living,
of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and
its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production
of energy from the water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:
(i)
the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations
and structures;
(ii)
marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention
in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard
to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible
with the provisions of this Convention.
The rights set out in this article with respect to the sea-bed and subsoil
shall be exercised in accordance with Part VI [Continental Shelf].
Article 57

The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
Article 58
1.

2.

3.

In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked,
enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms
referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of
the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the
operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible
with the other provisions of this Convention.
Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to
the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with
this Part.
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention
in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights
and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions
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of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they
are not incompatible with this Part.
Article 59
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to
the coastal State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone, and
a conflict arises between the interests of the coastal State and any other State
or States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the
light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective
importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international
community as a whole.
Part VII
High Seas
Article 86
The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included
in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters
of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State. This article
does not entail any abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed by all States in the
exclusive economic zone in accordance with article 58.
Article 87
1.

The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down
by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises,
inter alia, both for coastal and landlocked States:
(a)

freedom of navigation;

(b)

freedom of overflight;

freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI
[Continental Shelf];
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted
under international law, subject to Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section
2 [Living Resources];
(f)
freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII [Marine
Scientific Research].
These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas,
and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect
to activities in the Area [deep seabed mining].
(c)

2.

Article 88
The high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.
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Article 89
No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its
sovereignty.
Article 98
1.

2.

Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as
he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers:
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being
lost;
(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in
distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such
action may reasonably be expected of him;
(c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its crew
and its passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship
of the name of his own ship, its port of registry and the nearest
port at which it will call.
Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding
safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so require, by way
of mutual regional arrangements co-operate with neighbouring States for
this purpose.
Article 101

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a
private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; ...
Article 103
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is intended by
the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing
one of the acts referred to in article 101. The same applies if the ship or aircraft
has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control
of the persons guilty of that act.
Article 105
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State,
every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by
piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the
property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may
decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action
to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights
of third parties acting in good faith.
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Article 110
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty,
a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than
a ship entitled to complete immunity in accordance with articles 95 and
96, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for
suspecting that:
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy;
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade;
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State
of the warship has jurisdiction under article 109;
(d) the ship is without nationality; or
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship
is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
In the cases provided for in paragraph 1, the warship may proceed to
verify the ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under
the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains
after the documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further
examination on board the ship, which must be carried out with all possible
consideration.
Ifthe suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded
has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for
any loss or damage that may have been sustained.
These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft.
These provisions also apply to any other duly authorized ships or aircraft
clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service.
Part XII
Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment
Article 192

States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.
Section 5. International Rules and National Legislation to
Prevent, Reduce and Control Pollution
of the Marine Environment
Article 212
1.

States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment from or through the atmosphere,
applicable to the air space under their sovereignty and to vessels flying
their flag or vessels or aircraft of their registry, taking into account
internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures and the safety of air navigation.
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States shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce
and control such pollution.
States, acting especially through competent international organizations
or diplomatic conference, shall endeavour to establish global and regional
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent,
reduce and control such pollution.
Section 6. Enforcement
Article 222

States shall enforce, within the air space under their sovereignty or with regard
to vessels flying their flag or vessels or aircraft of their registry, their laws
and regulations adopted in accordance with article 212, paragraph 1, and with
other provisions of this Convention and shall adopt laws and regulations and
take other measures necessary to implement applicable international rules
and standards established through competent international organizations or
diplomatic conference to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment from or through the atmosphere, in conformity with all relevant
international rules and standards concerning the safety of air navigation.
Section 7. Safeguards
Article 233
Nothing in sections 5, 6 and 7 affects the legal regime of straits used for
international navigation. However, if a foreign ship other than those referred
to in section 10 has committed a violation of the laws and regulations referred
to in article 42, paragraph 1(a) and (b), causing or threatening major damage
to the marine environment of the straits, the States bordering the straits may
take appropriate enforcement measures and if so shall respect mutatis mutandis
the provisions of this section.
Article 236
The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection and preservation
of the marine environment do not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, other
vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being,
only on government non-commercial service. However, each State shall ensure,
by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing operations or operational capabilities of such vessels or aircraft owned or operated by it, that
such vessels or aircraft act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable
and practicable, with this Convention.
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Part XV
Settlement of Disputes
Section 1. General Provisions
Article 281
1.

2.

If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed to seek settlement
of the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures
provided for in this Part apply only where no settlement has been reached
by recourse to such means and the agreement between the parties does
not exclude any further procedure.
If the parties have also agreed on a time-limit, paragraph 1 applies only
upon the expiration of that time-limit.
Article 282

If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation
or application of this Convention have agreed, through a general, regional or
bilateral agreement or otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of
any party to the dispute, be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding
decision, that procedure shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for
in this Part, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree.

Section 2. Compulsory Procedures Entailing a Binding Decision
Article 286
Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application
of this Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse
to section 1, be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the
court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section.
Article 287
1.

When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time
thereafter, a State shall be free to choose, by means of a written declaration,
one or more of the following means for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention:
(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in
accordance with Annex VI:
(b) the International Court of Justice;
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII;
(d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex
VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein.

3.

A State Party, which is a party to a dispute not covered by a declaration
in force, shall be deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with
Annex VII.
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4.

If the parties to a dispute have accepted the same procedure for the
settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to that procedure,
unless the parties otherwise agree.

5.

If the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same procedure for the
settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to arbitration in
accordance with Annex VII, unless the parties otherwise agree.
Section 3. Limitations and Exceptions to
Applicability of Section 2
Article 297

1.

Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention
with regard to the exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign rights or
jurisdiction provided for in this Convention shall be subject to the procedures provided for in section 2 in the following cases:
(a)

(b)

(c)

when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention
of the provisions of this Convention in regard to the freedoms and
rights of navigation, overflight or the laying of submarine cables
and pipelines, or in regard to other internationally lawful uses of
the sea specified in article 58;
when it is alleged that a State in exercising the aforementioned
freedoms, rights or uses has acted in contravention of this Convention or of laws or regulations adopted by the coastal States
in conformity with this Convention and other rules of international
law not incompatible with this Convention; or
when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention
of specified international rules and standards for the protection
and preservation of the marine environment which are applicable
to the coastal State and which have been established by this Convention
or through a competent international organization or diplomatic
conference in accordance with this Convention.
Article 298

1.

When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time
thereafter, a State may, without prejudice to the obligations arising under
section 1, declare in writing that it does not accept any one or more of
the procedures provided for in section 2 with respect to one or more
of the following categories of disputes:
(a)

(i) disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles
15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those
involving historic bays or titles, ...

(b)

disputes concerning military activities, including military activities
by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial
service, and disputes concerning law enforcement activities
in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded
from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under article 297,
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paragraph 2 [coastal state rights regarding marine scientific research]
or 3 [coastal state rights regarding living resources in the exclusive
economic zone];
(c) disputes in respect of which the Security Council of the United
Nations is exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter
of the United Nations, unless the Security Council decides to remove
the matter from its agenda or calls upon the parties to settle it
by the means provided for in this Convention.
A State Party which has made a declaration under paragraph 1 shall not
be entitled to submit any dispute falling within the excepted category of
disputes to any procedure in this Convention as against another State
Party, without the consent of that party.
Part XVI
General Provisions
Article 300

States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this
Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized
in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.
Article 301
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention,
States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations.
Article 302
Without prejudice to the right of a State Party to resort to the procedures
for the settlement of disputes provided for in this Convention, nothing in this
Convention shall be deemed to require a State Party, in the fulfilment of its
obligations under this Convention, to supply information the disclosure of
which is contrary to the essential interests of its security.
Article 304
The provisions of this Convention regarding responsibility and liability for
damage are without prejudice to the application of existing rules and the
development of further rules regarding responsibility and liability under
international law.
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Part XVII
Final Provisions
Article 309
No reservations or exceptions may be made to this Convention unless expressly
permitted by other articles of this Convention.
Article 310
Article 309 does not preclude a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to
this Convention, from making declarations or statements, however phrased
or named, with a view, interalia,to the harmonization of its laws and regulations
with the provisions of this Convention, provided that such declarations or
statements do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the
provisions of this Convention in their application to that State.
Article 311
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

This Convention shall prevail, as between States Parties, over the Geneva
Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 29 April 1958.
This Convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties
which arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention and
which do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights
or the performance of their obligations under this Convention.
Two or more States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or suspending the operation of provisions of this Convention, applicable solely
to the relations between them, provided that such agreements do not relate
to a provision derogation from which is incompatible with the effective
execution of the object and purpose of this Convention, and provided
further that such agreements shall not affect the application of the basic
principles embodied herein, and that the provisions of such agreements
do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the
performance of their obligations under this Convention.
States Parties intending to conclude an agreement referred to in paragraph
3 shall notify the other States Parties through the depositary of this
Convention of their intention to conclude the agreement and of the modification
or suspension for which it provides.
This article does not affect international agreements expressly permitted
or preserved by other articles of this Convention.

